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“Learning must be stolen, taken as a kind of bodily eminent
1
domain.”
INTRODUCTION
One January, two-year-old Jeffery Felice complained of pain when
2
he urinated. Jeffery’s parents also noticed that the foreskin of his
3
penis had difficulty retracting. They took the child to a physician,
4
who diagnosed his condition as “phimosis” and recommended
5
circumcision surgery. The surgery was performed on February 2nd
by Dr. William Goodger, a first-year family practice resident, while
under the supervision of a third-year surgical resident, Dr. Cynthia
6
Glass. These two residents were the only physicians present during
the surgery. Dr. Glass instructed Dr. Goodger to perform the
7
circumcision using the “guillotine technique.”
Although the cutting was typically performed with a scalpel, Dr.
Glass instructed Dr. Goodger to cut Jeffery’s foreskin with an
8
Electrosurgical Unit (“ESU”). The ESU consisted of a surgical pencil
that operated by applying a high frequency electrical current to the
9
cutting site. The unit had two modes, one for cutting and one for
10
Jeffery’s circumcision began with the ESU in the
coagulation.
cutting mode with a setting of one on the power dial, but then was
raised to two-and-one-half when the initial setting seemed to fail to
11
make a cut. Thereafter, Dr. Glass instructed Dr. Goodger to cease
cutting after he had cut approximately one-third of the distance
across the foreskin.
1. ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT
SCIENCE 32 (2002).
2. Felice v. Valleylab, Inc., 520 So. 2d 920, 922 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
3. Id.
4. BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 398 (38th ed. 1995) (“[Phimosis is] a condition
of great narrowing at the edge of the foreskin for which the operation of
circumcision . . . may be necessary.”).
5. Felice, 520 So. 2d at 922.
6. Id. at 923.
7. Id. This procedure is described as the following:
In this technique the foreskin of the penis is stretched past the end of the
penis and clamped with a hemostat to hold the foreskin in a position to be
cut off. After the excess foreskin is cut away, the bleeding is controlled and
the edges of the foreskin are sutured together. Generally the cutting in
circumcisions is performed with a scalpel.
Id.
8. Id. at 923, 928.
9. See id. at 923 (identifying the theoretical benefits of the ESU as a reduction in
bleeding at the surgical cutting site and the elimination of the necessity of “tying-off”
the blood vessels).
10. Id. at 923.
11. Id.
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Dr. Glass apparently saw that something was wrong because the
child’s penis had retracted and was very pale. Then she noticed that
12
the child’s penis had sustained a full thickness burn, evidently due
13
to excess electrical current running through his tissue. Jeffery was
sent home from the hospital, but began to run a high fever. Jeffery’s
external penile tissue eventually sloughed off, leaving the
14
unfortunate child with no visible penile tissue.
At trial in the malpractice case brought in the wake of the Felice
surgery, Dr. Glass testified that “she had been trained to perform a
circumcision with a scalpel in medical school and that she had not
15
been instructed on the use of an ESU in circumcisions,” and that
“[s]he had always performed circumcisions with a scalpel until one
16
week before the Felice surgery.”
The week before the Felice
surgery, however, Dr. Glass and another resident had “discussed the
17
possible benefits of using an ESU for a circumcision.” The court
noted:
Dr. Glass never inquired of her supervising doctors as to whether
the use of an ESU was proper for circumcision surgery. She did
not inspect the literature or the manual to see if there would be
any dangers in the use of ESU in circumcision. Dr. Glass merely
decided to try it and see what effect the ESU would have upon the
surgery, since she considered it an improvement upon wellestablished technique. Dr. Glass also admitted that she had never
held the ESU “surgical pencil” in her hand to cut the foreskin in a
circumcision. She twice had instructed two residents on a
procedure she had never performed herself. Dr. Glass also
admitted that it was a precept of medicine that any modification of
a learned technique would never be done without a full
18
appreciation of all the risks involved in the modification.

One issue in the Jeffery Felice case was the potential vicarious
liability of Dr. Glass’s employer. That issue depended on whether the
resident, Dr. Glass, had been negligent, a question that ultimately
depended in large part on the standard of care to which surgical
19
residents should be held. That question is the subject of this Article.
12. Id.
13. Id. Dr. Glass then removed the rest of the foreskin with scissors, sutured the
incision by hand, and applied an ointment to the burned area. Id.
14. See id. (“Put in simpler terms, his penis was gone.”).
15. Id. at 928.
16. Id.
17. Id. After this discussion, but before the Felice surgery, the doctor instructed
a resident to use the ESU to perform a circumcision and the surgery had no ill
effects.
18. Id.
19. The court decided this question by holding that, for the purposes of the
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The circumstances of the Felice tragedy illustrate the disaccord
underlying the question of the standard of care by which the
professional conduct of medical residents is to be judged. This
tension springs from the need to accommodate two potentially
antagonistic, or at least dissonant, goals. On the one hand, patients’
health and lives are at risk because they are treated by residents every
day. A significant quantum of the health care in the United States is
delivered by medical school graduates who are engaged in postgraduate residency programs (including those graduates traditionally
referred to as “interns”). But, moving from the microcosm to a
longer term perspective, the health and safety of all of us depend on
residents’ learning. Residency programs are vital components in the
education and training of physicians for the independent practice of
medicine. This is particularly true for the growing majority of
physicians today who undertake a longer residency in preparation to
20
practice a medical specialty. Respected physician and essayist Dr.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked that
The most essential part of a student’s instruction is obtained . . .
not in the lecture-room, but at the bedside. Nothing seen there is
lost; the rhythms of disease are learned by frequent repetition; its
unforeseen occurrences stamp themselves indelibly in the
memory . . . . The bedside is always the true centre of medical
21
teaching.

vicarious liability of the employer of a third-year resident in surgery who held herself
out as limiting her practice to surgery, the resident should be held to the standard of
a specialist, namely a surgeon. Id. at 928-29. The court also affirmed the trial court’s
finding that Dr. Glass was negligent in modifying the circumcision technique, the
state was vicariously liable, and the medical school was independently negligent in its
supervision of Dr. Glass during her residency training. Id.; see also infra Part II.A.2
(addressing the standard of care for licensed residents). Neither resident was a
defendant in this case. Felice, 520 So. 2d at 924-29.
20. See infra notes 71, 74 (citing GAO reports which document the prevalence of
medical specialties in the United States).
21. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Scholastic and Bedside Teaching, in IX THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, MEDICAL ESSAYS, 1842-1882 273, 276 (Riverside
ed. 1911) [hereinafter DR. HOLMES WRITINGS]. Dr. Holmes was a respected medical
lecturer and essayist who was also the father of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. He
also noted the “great hospitals . . . are the true centers of medical education.”
HOLMES, The Young Practitioner, in DR. HOLMES WRITINGS, supra, at 374. In comparing
the clinical education at the bedside with the classroom, Holmes commented:
When I compare this direct transfer of the practical experience of a wise
man into the mind of a student,—every fact one that he can use in the battle
of life and death,—with the far off, unserviceable ‘scientific’ truths that I and
some others are in the habit of teaching, I cannot help asking myself
whether . . . there is not a possibility that we may sometimes attempt to teach
too much.
HOLMES, Scholastic and Bedside Teaching, in DR. HOLMES WRITINGS, supra, at 284.
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This tension is candidly exemplified in the personal account of Dr.
Atul Gawande from the perspective of a physician in training as a
surgical resident:
In medicine, we have long faced a conflict between the
imperative to give patients the best possible care and the need to
provide novices with experience. Residencies attempt to mitigate
potential harm through supervision and graduated responsibility.
And there is reason to think patients actually benefit from
teaching. Studies generally find teaching hospitals have better
outcomes than non-teaching hospitals. Residents may be amateurs,
but having them around checking on patients, asking questions,
and keeping faculty on their toes seems to help. But there is still
no getting around those first few unsteady times a young physician
tries to put in a central line, remove a breast cancer, or sew
together two segments of colon. No matter how many protections
we put in place, on average these cases go less well with the novice
than with someone experienced.
We have no illusions about this. When an attending physician
brings a sick family member in for surgery, people at the hospital
think hard about how much to let trainees participate. Even when
the attending insists that they participate as usual, a resident
scrubbing in knows that it will be far from a teaching case. And if a
central line must be put in, a first-timer is certainly not going to do
it. Conversely, the ward services and clinics where residents have
the most responsibility are populated by the poor, the uninsured,
22
the drunk, and the demented.

To underscore the point, Dr. Gawande relates his actions after his
own eleven-day-old child suddenly went into congestive heart failure
one Sunday morning from what turned out to be a defect in his
23
aorta. Following a successful surgical repair of the cardiac defect,
and nearing the time for the child’s discharge from the hospital, Dr.
Gawande was forced to select a pediatric cardiologist to follow the
22. GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 24; cf. Gregory L. Larkin, Walter Kantor & John J.
Zielinski, Doing unto Others? Emergency Medicine Residents’ Willingness to Be Treated by
Moonlighting Residents and Nonphysician Clinicians in the Emergency Department, 8 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 886, 888-90 (2001) (reporting that more than 72.9% of emergency
medical residents responding to a survey during their final year in residency training
would not agree to let an unsupervised resident treat them in an emergency
department for a serious condition, and nearly forty percent would refuse to allow a
solo resident to care for even a moderate injury or illness); see generally Samuel Keim
& Carey Chisholm, Moonlighting and Emergency Medicine: Raising the Standard, 7 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 927, 927 (2000) (commenting that perhaps proponents of
moonlighting by residents to augment their experience may really mean “that they
value this additional work experience, but not with their patients nor at their own
hospital”).
23. GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 31.
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child and decide on his later treatment and surgeries. When
approached by the cardiac fellow who had spent the most time with
the child, Dr. Gawande opted instead to have the child attended in
24
the future by a senior member of the hospital’s cardiology staff. “I
25
know this was not fair,” Dr. Gawande admitted. But “[m]y son had
an unusual problem. The fellow needed the experience . . . . [but
26
t]his was my child.”
The law of medical malpractice is one mechanism for protecting
patients. It does so by its liability rules that deter substandard
conduct and provide compensation for victims. The measure by
which a health care provider’s professional conduct is assessed is set
by the standard of care. Our question is how the standard of care
rules for residents should be formulated to strike a sensible balance
between the goals of protecting patients while permitting the
essential clinical education of residents. Should medical residents be
held to the level of expertise expected of reasonably competent
general physicians, to specialists in the area of their residency, to a
more subjective standard reflecting the level and stage of training of
the particular resident physician in question, or in accordance with
some other rule?
These questions are important. Resident physicians are commonly
named as defendants in connection with injuries suffered by
27
patients, and vicarious liability claims against hospitals depend on
whether their employee-residents have committed tortious conduct.
These questions have been given short shrift by the courts. Analysis
of the underlying conflicting interests has too often been desultory,
28
inconsistent, and insensitive to the competing demands of
24. Id. at 32. Dr. Gawande elaborated:
“You know, there is always an attending backing me up,” the young fellow
said. I shook my head . . . . I know this was not fair. My son had an unusual
problem. The fellow needed the experience. Of all people, I, a resident,
should have understood. But I was not torn about the decision. This was my
child. Given a choice, I will always choose the best care I can for him. How
can anybody be expected to do otherwise? Certainly, the future of medicine
should not rely on it.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Allen Kachalia & David M. Studdert, Professional Liability Issues in Graduate
Medical Education, 292 JAMA 1051, 1052 (2004) (referencing malpractice insurance
data which covered multiple teaching hospitals and more than 8,000 physicians and
finding that residents were named in twenty-two percent of malpractice claims
between 1994 and 2003).
28. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 81-82 (N.J.
2002) (noting that few jurisdictions have confronted the question of potential
liability when the patient receives misleading or inadequate information regarding a
physician’s credentials or experience, or what potential causes of action might
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immediate patient safety (through sound medical care at the
moment) and the long-term demands of patient safety in general
(through doctors highly trained in clinical practical medicine during
their crucial residencies).
Part I of this Article provides an overview of medical residency
programs. Part II briefly examines the approaches of courts to the
question of the standard of care of medical residents. In Part II, I will
also discuss the potential use of the doctrine of informed consent to
address the matter of the relationship between residents and patients.
Part III proposes a different approach. Rather than mediate the
matter of treatment by medical residents exclusively through either
the standard of care or the doctrine of informed consent (or some
other information-based theory of liability), I propose a more elegant
solution that melds the two doctrines. It may be summarized as
follows. When medical residents (both not-yet-licensed and licensed
ones) fully disclose their status, including their experience, training,
education, and credentials, to their patients, then their performance
should be judged by a standard of care commensurate with their
actual level of post-graduate medical training, education, and
experience. Licensed residents should in addition, and as a
minimum, be held to the standard of a licensed general practitioner.
A resident (either licensed or not-yet-fully-licensed) who either
affirmatively misstates or fails to disclose his status should not be
permitted to avail himself of the standard that is commensurate with
his limited experience and training. If such resident affirmatively
misrepresents his credentials and experience, then at a minimum, he
should at least be held to the standard commensurate with the
professional background that he claims to possess.
When a resident fails to appropriately disclose his status, a not-yetfully-licensed resident should be held to the standard of care
expected of a fully-licensed physician who has completed his
internship. A non-disclosing licensed resident actively participating
in a graduate medical program to prepare him for a medical specialty
should be held to the standard of the specialty covered by his
residency program when serving in the capacity of a specialist, unless
he can prove that the patient’s reasonable expectations were of some
less demanding standard, in which case he should be held to a
standard commensurate with those expectations.
apply); Justin L. Ward, Comment, Medical Residents: Should They be Held to a Different
Standard of Care?, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 283, 288 (2001) (stating that there are not that
many federal and state decisions on the issue and that the existing decisions are
inconsistent).
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I believe that the suggested approach is a sensible compromise
between the competing safety and autonomy interests of the
immediate patients treated by residents and the longer term interests
of the health care system and its patients in being attended by welltrained physicians, particularly specialists. If residents wish to be
judged by a more forgiving, experienced-based standard of care, then
a sincere and reasonable effort to inform their patients about their
level of experience seems a suitable counterpoise.
I should insert a caveat here. Many tort claims arising out of
injuries caused by allegedly substandard medical care by residents are
also commonly asserted against one or more other health care
providers. Those additional potential defendants may include the
attending-supervising physician and the sponsoring hospitalemployer of the resident, and may be based on theories of direct
liability for inadequate supervision or monitoring of the resident
and/or vicarious liability when a legally-sufficient relationship is
deemed to exist between a resident who was a cause of a patient’s
29
injury and another potential defendant-health care provider. The
potential liability of these other physicians or hospitals that may be
exposed to potential liability in connection with injuries inflicted at
least in part by residents is beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather, the focus here is on the narrower question of the standard
of care applicable in assessing whether the professional conduct of a
medical resident was negligent. Of course, the outcome of the
question of whether a resident was negligent may often be relevant to
claims against those other health care providers who may be sued in
connection with injuries contributed to by residents. Thus, for
example, in order to support a vicarious liability claim against a
sponsoring hospital employer of a resident, one precondition is a
finding that the resident-employee had committed tortious, liabilityproducing conduct.
I.

POST-GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING—
RESIDENCIES

A “resident” or “resident physician” is “[a]n individual at any level
in a graduate medical education program, including subspecialty
30
programs.” The term “resident physician” evolved to reflect the fact
29. See Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 27, at 1053-55 (discussing the relationship
between the attending physician and the sponsoring institution and the physician’s
potential liability with regards to resident physician care).
30. AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL GLOSSARY, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/cate
gory/2376.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
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that in the early 1900s, residents’ relationships to hospitals “[a]ll
provided a similar experience of literally living and working in the
hospital, tending to the moment-by-moment affairs of patients and
observing the practice habits of eminent physicians of the day for
31
several years.”
For present purposes, the term “resident” will refer to any
physician who has graduated from medical school, and is
participating in a post-graduate, hospital-based training and
education program. Residents include both not-yet-licensed physicians
32
(formerly referred to as “interns” ) who are completing a shorter
period of post-graduate training and education (usually one to three
years) required in order to obtain a license to independently practice
33
medicine, and licensed physicians who are continuing on in their
graduate medical education and training in order to become
qualified (board certified) in their chosen medical specialty (and
sometimes in a further subspecialty). There are currently about
100,000 resident physicians engaged in this type of graduate medical
34
education in the United States. A majority of these physicians not
only are or will become licensed but will continue in a program in
order to become qualified in a medical specialty, reflecting the fact

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1931 (3d ed. 1931) (defining “residency” as a period of
advanced medical training and education which typically follows graduation from
medical school and includes supervised practice and instruction in a specialty in a
hospital setting). Other terms sometimes used to refer to some of these individuals
“include interns, house officers, house staff, trainees, or fellows.” Id. The
designation “fellow” is sometimes used “to denote physicians in subspecialty
programs (versus residents in specialty programs) or in graduate medical education
programs that are beyond the requirements for eligibility for first board certification
in the discipline.” Id.
31. RITA KWAN & ROBERT LEVY, AM. MED. STUDENT ASS’N, A PRIMER ON: RESIDENT
WORK HOURS 3 (6th ed. 2005) (emphasis added), available at http://www.amsa.org/
rwh/RWHprimer_6thEdition.pdf.
32. See AM. MED. ASS’N, HOW DO YOU BECOME A PHYSICIAN?, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/14365.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2005) (“Some refer to
the first year of residency as an ‘internship’; the AMA no longer uses this term.”).
33. Dr. Reuter notes:
Although physicians receive their M.D. degrees at the completion of medical
school, most states require at least one year of clinical training before
granting an unlimited license to practice medicine. Thus, the first year of
residency is really an extension of medical school, in which the resident
acquires additional knowledge and begins to make independent medical
decisions.
Reuter, supra note 40, at 485-86. See also JAMA Patient Page, Your Doctor’s Education, 9
J.A.M.A. 1198 (2000) (“After medical school, doctors must complete 1 to 3 years of
residency training to be eligible to take the examination for their medical license”).
34. Sarah E. Brotherton, Paul H. Rockey & Sylvia I. Etzel, US Graduate Medical
Education, 2003-2004, 292 JAMA 1032, 1033 (2004) (“As of December 31, 2003, there
were 99,964 resident physicians enrolled in ACGME-accredited and combined
specialty GME programs, the highest ever recorded by the National GME Census.”).
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that more than two-thirds of physicians today are currently practicing
35
36
in a medical specialty or subspecialty.
The principal accrediting organization for residency programs in
the United States is the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
37
Education (“ACGME”). It was established in 1981 out of a perceived
need in the medical community for an independent accrediting
38
organization for graduate medical education programs.
The
ACGME is a private, non-profit organization that accredits about
8,000 residency programs relating to 119 specialties and
39
subspecialties. A residency program, in its modern incarnation, has
been defined as follows:
A residency program is a period of education and training that
physicians undergo after they graduate from medical school in
order to learn how to care for patients in their chosen specialty.
Most residency programs last from three to seven years, during
which residents care for patients under the supervision of physician
faculty and participate in educational and research activities.
When physicians graduate from a residency program, they are

35. See id. at 1033 (noting that “[t]he number of subspecialty programs increased
13% during the past 6 years”).
36. The percentage of medical residents choosing a subspecialty instead of
primary care has increased in recent years. See Myrie Croasdale, Subspecialties
Flourishing as IM Residents Shun Primary Care, 48 AM. MED. NEWS 1, 1 (2001) (reporting
on internal medicine residents opting to pursue a subspecialty).
37. See Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., The ACGME at a Glance,
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/newsRoom/newsRm_acGlance.asp (last visited
Nov. 12, 2005) (identifying 101,810 full-time and part-time residents and 8,037
accredited residency programs for the academic year 2004-05).
38. See id. (acknowledging the Liaison Committee for Graduate Medical
Education as its forerunner).
39. Id. Its mission is to improve the quality of patient care by improving and
maintaining the quality of graduate medical education for physicians in training
throughout the United States. Id. ACGME has “27 residency review committees
(one for each of the 26 specialties and one for a special one-year transitional year
general clinical program),” with each committee “compris[ing] 6 to 15 volunteer
physicians appointed by the ACGME’s member organizations and the appropriate
medical specialty boards and organizations.” Id. Its governance has been described
as follows:
The members of the ACGME Board of Directors are appointed in equal
number by the American Association of Medical Colleges, American Board
of Medical Specialties, American Hospital Association, American Medical
Association and Council of Medical Specialty Societies. The Board also
includes two resident members, three public members and a federal
representative appointed by the Department of Health and Human
Services . . . . The ACGME governance structure also includes a Council of
Review Committee Chairs, consisting of the chairs of the 27 residency review
committees and the Institutional Review Committee, and a Council of review
Committee Residents, comprising resident members of the review
committees.
ACGME Fact Sheet, infra note 40.
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eligible to take their board certification examinations and begin
40
practicing independently.

The accreditation standards of the ACGME Common Program
Requirements address a number of specific areas. These include, for
41
example, provisions relating to supervision of residents, restrictions
42
43
on duty hours, provisions for adequate free time, restrictions on
40. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., ACGME Fact Sheet,
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/newsRoom/newsRm_factSheet.asp (last visited
Nov. 12, 2005) [hereinafter ACGME Fact Sheet]; see also Stewart R. Reuter,
Professional Liability in Postgraduate Medical Education, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 485, 485-86
(1994). Dr. Reuter describes residents as follows:
Residents are physicians in transition. They have graduated from
medical school and have the basic skills to practice medicine; yet, they still
have much to learn to practice at the more complex level of the specialist.
Even physicians entering family practice and general internal medicine serve
residency programs and become board certified in these specialties.
The first year of postgraduate education is either transitional (also called
preliminary, rotating, or flexible) or categorical. In the former, first-year
residents rotate through various specialties, usually medicine, surgery,
obstetrics, and pediatrics, broadening their general medical knowledge.
Trainees selecting a transitional year generally move on to one of the
specialties that requires a preliminary clinical year but does not have an
integrated categorical year, such as radiology, pathology, or anesthesiology.
Transitional years are relatively unregulated by national accrediting
organizations and the content is largely at the discretion of the teaching
hospital or the medical school that supervises the teaching hospital.
The categorical year, on the other hand, is really the first year of a
residency program in one of the more direct patient care specialties, such as
medicine, surgery, pediatrics, or obstetrics-gynecology. Also, medical school
graduates who want to enter surgical subspecialties serve a preliminary year
of general surgery residency and then move to ophthalmology, orthopedics,
urology, and the like. Residencies are three to seven years long and lead,
following a qualifying examination, to board certification in the specialty.
Id.
41. The requirements provide:
VI. Resident Duty Hours and the Working Environment
A. Supervision of Residents
1. All patient care must be supervised by qualified faculty. The program
director must ensure, direct, and document adequate supervision of
residents at all times. Residents must be provided with rapid, reliable
systems for communicating with supervising faculty.
2. Faculty schedules must be structured to provide residents with
continuous supervision and consultation.
3. Faculty and residents must be educated to recognize the signs of
fatigue, and adopt and apply policies to prevent and counteract its potential
negative effects.
ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., COMMON PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS 7 (2004), available at http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHours/d
h_dutyHoursCommonPR.pdf.
42. The requirements state, in part:
VI. Resident Duty Hours and the Working Environment
B. Duty Hours
1. Duty hours are defined as all clinical and academic activities related to
the residency program; i.e., patient care (both inpatient and outpatient),
administrative duties relative to patient care, the provision for transfer of
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44

on-call activities, and assurances against moonlighting that interferes
45
with the program. Resident work hours have also been addressed by
46
a few state statutes.
patient care, time spent in-house during call activities, and scheduled
activities such as conferences. Duty hours do not include reading and
preparation time spent away from the duty site.
2. Duty hours must be limited to 80 hours per week, averaged over a
four-week period, inclusive of all in-house call activities.
3. Residents must be provided with 1 day in 7 free from all educational
and clinical responsibilities, averaged over a 4-week period, inclusive of call.
One day is defined as 1 continuous 24-hour period free from all clinical,
educational, and administrative duties.
Id. (emphasis in original). These ACGME mandated restrictions on resident work
hours became effective on July 1, 2004. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED.
EDUC., NEW INSERTIONS INTO THE COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL CORE AND
SUBSPECIALTY PROGRAMS [hereinafter ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS], available at
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHours/dh_Lang703.pdf (last visited Nov. 12,
2005). For an overview of this new policy, see Manda J. Seaver, ACGME’s New
Requirements: An Overview, 12 AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS BULL. 11 (2003),
available at http://www.aans.org/bulletin/pdfs/summer03.pdf (highlighting six
substantive restrictions). For background on the situation prior to the latest ACGME
standards on duty hours, see Scott Turner, Medical Residency: An Exercise in Sleep
Deprivation, 26 GEORGE STREET J. (2001), http://www.brown.edu/Administration/Ge
orge_Street_Journal/vol26/26GSJ06h.html (noting that AGCME resident work hour
standards in the past too often were not observed). For pending legislation in
Congress addressing work hours of post-graduate trainees (fellows, residents, and
interns), see Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2005, S. 1297, 109th
Cong. (2005), H.R. 1228, 109th Cong. (2005).
43. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, III.B.4, at 8 (“Adequate time for
rest and personal activities must be provided. This should consist of a 10-hour time
period provided between all daily duty periods and after in-house call.”).
44. The ACGME guidelines state:
VI. Resident Duty Hours and the Working Environment
C. On-call Activities
The objective of on-call activities is to provide residents with continuity of
patient care experiences throughout a 24-hour period. In-house call is
defined as those duty hours beyond the normal work day, when residents are
required to be immediately available in the assigned institution.
1. In-house call must occur no more frequently than every third night,
averaged over a 4-week period.
2. Continuous on-site duty, including in-house call, must not exceed 24
consecutive hours. Residents may remain on duty for up to 6 additional
hours to participate in didactic activities, transfer care of patients, conduct
outpatient clinics, and maintain continuity of medical and surgical care. [as
further specified by the RRC]
3. No new patients may be accepted after 24 hours of continuous duty.
[as further specified by the RRC]
4. At-home call (or pager call) is defined as a call taken from outside the
assigned institution.
a) The frequency of at-home call is not subject to the every-third-night
limitation. At-home call, however, must not be so frequent as to preclude
rest and reasonable personal time for each resident. Residents taking
at-home call must be provided with 1 day in 7 completely free from all
educational and clinical responsibilities, averaged over a 4-week period.
b) When residents are called into the hospital from home, the hours
residents spend in-house are counted toward the 80-hour limit.
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In addition to any supplemental requirements developed by each
47
specialty, the ACGME Common Program Requirements also include
a condition that each residency program “require its residents to
obtain competence in the six areas listed below to the level expected
48
of a new practitioner.” These core competencies are described as
follows:
Programs must define the specific knowledge, skills, behaviors, and
attitudes required, and provide educational experiences as needed
in order for their residents to demonstrate the following:
1. Patient care that is compassionate, appropriate, and effective
for the treatment of health programs and the promotion of health;
2. Medical Knowledge about established and evolving biomedical,
clinical, and cognate sciences, as well as the application of this
knowledge to patience care;
3. Practice-based learning and improvement that involves the
investigation and evaluation of care for their patients, the appraisal
and assimilation of scientific evidence, and improvements in
patient care;
4. Interpersonal and communication skills that result in the effective
exchange of information and collaboration with patients, their
families, and other health professionals;
5. Professionalism, as manifested through a commitment to
carrying out professional responsibilities, adherence to ethical
principles, and sensitivity to patients of diverse backgrounds;
6. Systems-based practice, as manifested by actions that demonstrate
an awareness of and responsiveness to the larger context and
system of health care, as well as the ability to call effectively on
49
other resources in the system to provide optimal health care.

c) The program director and the faculty must monitor the demands of
at-home call in their programs, and make scheduling adjustments as
necessary to mitigate excessive service demands and/or fatigue.
Id. VI.C., at 8. Not long ago, residents, provided most on-call services at teaching
hospitals. Reuter, supra note 40, at 517.
45. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, VI.D.1, at 8 (providing inter alia
that “[b]ecause residency education is a full-time endeavor, the program director
must ensure that moonlighting does not interfere with the ability of the resident to
achieve the goals and objectives of the educational program”).
46. For background on the New York statutory regulation of resident work hours,
see Alan S. Boulos & A. John Popp, Resident Work Hour Restrictions: The New York
Experience, 12 AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS BULL. 16, 16 (2003), available at
http://www.aans.org/bulletin/pdfs/summer03.pdf (identifying New York as ahead
of the curve for placing restrictions on resident work hours).
47. ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, at 1.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 6-7.
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Residents’ training is to a substantial extent clinical and practice50
This is reflected in the core competencies providing for
based.
application of medical knowledge “to patient care” and for needed
educational experiences in “practice-based learning and
51
improvement.” It is these core competencies and the clinical focus
of residency training that are most relevant for our purposes.
Medical residents may not be in the position to offer the level of
care to patients that an experienced physician, particularly a
52
specialist, could provide.
There are a number of factors
contributing to this reality. By definition, residents lack clinical
53
experience on a relative basis. Medical education and experience50. One doctor’s experiences in a surgical residency program are informative:
And it works.
There have now been many studies of elite
performers-international violinists, chess grand masters, professional
ice-skaters, mathematicians, and so forth-and the biggest difference
researchers find between them and lesser performers is the cumulative
amount of deliberate practice they’ve had. Indeed, the most important
talent may be the talent for practice itself. K. Anders Ericsson, a cognitive
psychologist and expert on performance, notes that the most important way
in which innate factors play a role may be in one’s willingness to engage in
sustained training. He’s found, for example, that top performers dislike
practicing just as much as others do. (That’s why, for example, athletes and
musicians usually quit practicing when they retire.) But more than others,
they have the will to keep at it anyway.
I still have no idea what I did differently that day. But from then on, my
lines went in. Practice is funny that way. For days and days, you make out
only the fragments of what to do. And then one day you’ve got the thing
whole. Conscious learning becomes unconscious knowledge, and you
cannot say precisely how.
GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 20-21.
51. Some specialties elaborate. Thus, for example, the Resident Review
Committee for internal medicine has adopted the following program guideline:
“Residents must have direct patient responsibility, including participation in
diagnosis, management, and admission decisions across the broad spectrum of
medical, surgical, and psychiatric illnesses, such that the residents learn how to
determine which patients require hospitalization.” ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR
GRADUATE MED. EDUC., PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR RESIDENCY EDUCATION IN
INTERNAL MEDICINE 21 (2004), available at http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/downlo
ads/RRC_progReq/140pr703_u704.pdf.
52. See, e.g., A. Antoine Kazzi et al., Emergency Medicine Residency Applicant
Educational Debt: Relationship with Attitude Toward Training and Moonlighting, 7 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 1399, 1405 (2000) (reporting that emergency medicine residents
acknowledge “a higher risk of adverse outcome when practicing prior to completion
of EM training”).
53. Thus, Dr. Gawande writes:
No matter how accomplished, surgeons trying something new got worse
before they got better, and the learning curve proved longer, and affected by
a far more complicated range of factors, than anyone had realized. It’s all
stark confirmation that you can’t train novices without compromising patient
care.
This, I suspect, is the reason for the physician’s dodge: the “I just assist”
rap; the “We have a new procedure for this that you are perfect for” speech;
the “You need a central line” without the “I am still learning how to do this.”
Sometimes we do feel obliged to admit when we’re doing something for the
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based training are most accurately thought of as parts of a
54
continuum, from medical students to board certified specialists and
subspecialists, and then throughout one’s medical career. Dr.
Stewart Reuter describes the learning curve during residency this way:
Residencies are really preceptorships, in which the students learn
by caring for patients under the watchful eye of a university faculty
member or an attending private practitioner. The ACGME
requires graduated, progressive responsibility by the residents as
they move from year to year of residency. Thus, a first-year surgery
resident primarily assists a board certified teaching surgeon.
However, as they advance into their third and fourth years of
training, surgical residents begin to perform simple operations by
themselves. By their fifth year, they may perform complex
operations without the immediate supervision of the faculty
surgeon. In a pathology residency, the first-year resident probably
interprets all slides side-by-side with a faculty member, progressing
to a situation in the fourth year in which the resident interprets
pathological materials semi-independently, with a faculty member
available nearby for consultation in case the resident is uncertain
55
about a diagnosis.

Moreover, although the ACGME continues to address the problem
56
of resident hours in their accreditation standards, the reality may be
first time, but even then we tend to quote the published success rates-which
are virtually always from experienced surgeons. Do we ever tell patients that
because we are still new at something, their risks will inevitably be higher,
and that they’d likely do better with others who are more experienced? Do
we ever say that we need them to agree to it anyway? I’ve never seen it.
Given the stakes, who in their right mind would agree to be practiced upon?
GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 30.
54. This continuum of learning transcends medical school and even the
residency experience, and continues throughout one’s professional medical life. It
has been described by one doctor nearing the end of his residency as he reflected on
the insights shared by his father:
Only now, as I get glimpses of the end of my training, have I begun to think
hard about my father’s success. For most of residency, I thought of surgery
as a more or less fixed body of knowledge and skill which is acquired in
training and perfected in practice. There was, as I envisioned it, a smooth,
upward-sloping arc of proficiency at some rarefied set of tasks (for me,
taking out gallbladders, colon cancers, bullets, and appendices; for him,
taking out kidney stones, testicular cancers, and swollen prostates). The arc
would peak at, say, ten or fifteen years, plateau for a long time, and perhaps
tail off a little in the final five years before retirement. The reality, however,
turns out to be far messier. You do get good at certain things, my father tells
me, but no sooner than you do, you find what you know is outmoded. New
technologies and operations emerge to supplant the old, and the learning
curve starts all over again. “Three-quarters of what I do today I never
learned in residency,” he says.
GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 25.
55. Reuter, supra note 40, at 487.
56. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, VI.B, at 7 (delineating duty hour
guidelines to ensure residents receive adequate rest).
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57

that residents do not get enough sleep. Not only are current duty
58
hour guidelines still pretty high, there is also a problem with
59
compliance with ACGME norms. Hospitals may sometimes be less
than enthusiastic about restricting the work hours of their residentemployees because “any duty schedule changes could involve millions
of dollars in increased labor costs. And teaching hospitals already
face fiscal constraints due to decreased reimbursements for medical
60
education.” There may also be resistance in some quarters in the
medical profession to restrictions on resident work hours based on
61
the perceived tradition in medicine.
Surveys suggest that many
62
63
medical residents moonlight, primarily for financial reasons, which
57. See Turner, supra note 42 (noting in connection with ACGME work hour
standards prior to the 2003 change that ACGME standards “go unobserved too
often,” and that if residents do not get sufficient sleep, it “may be unsafe for
patients”).
58. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, VI.B.2, at 7 (discussing eightyhour work weeks).
59. Turner, supra note 42 (noting that AGCME resident work hour standards in
the past too often were not observed); see also KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 8
(noting that some residents still work 114 hours a week despite the ACGME
regulations); Craig Horowitz, The Doctor Is Out, NEW YORK METRO.COM, Nov. 3, 2003,
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/health/features/n_9426/index.html (rep
orting compliance failures in some states that have adopted specific regulations that
limit the number of hours residents may work in hospitals). For accounts of the
fascinating background of the impetus in the famous Libby Zion case for the New
York resident work hour rules, see KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 4 (crediting Libby
Zion’s death with sparking national attention to the issue of resident work hours);
Horowitz, supra (discussing Sidney Zion’s litigation with the hospital in connection
with the death of his daughter, Libby Zion).
60. Turner, supra note 42; see David M. Gaba & Steven K. Howard, Fatigue Among
Clinicians and the Safety of Patients, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1249, 1254 (2002) (“Since
residents provide cheap labor, nearly all options for reducing their work hours are
expensive—an estimated $1.4 billion to $1.8 billion per year nationwide.”).
61. See KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 16 (noting that “many physicians opposed
the regulation of resident work hours on the grounds that it would create ‘time-clock
medicine’ by forcing residents to focus on their timecard rather than patient care”);
see also Turner, supra note 42 (“The medical profession has a mantra: A fatigued
doctor who is familiar with a case is better than a fresh physician who doesn’t know a
thing about the patient.”); Dongwood John Chang & Susan Bell, The Impact of
Residents’ 80-Hour Workweek on Neurological Training and Patient Care, 12 AM. ASS’N
NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS BULL. 1, 7-8 (2003), available at http://www.aans.org/bullet
in/pdfs/summer03.pdf (documenting concerns that the ACGME’s restrictions will
create a “shift worker” mentality, thereby eroding professionalism and limiting
educational opportunities).
62. Moonlighting refers “to sporadic or part-time, unsupervised EM practice by
residents in EDs or urgent care settings.” Kazzi et al., supra note 52, at 1400
(discussing moonlighting in the context of emergency medicine residents).
63. See Jeffrey N. Glaspy, O. John Ma, Mark T. Steele, & Jacqueline Hall, Survey of
Emergency Medicine Resident Debt Status and Financial Planning Preparedness, 12 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 52, 53 (2005) (reporting that fifty-eight percent of emergency
medicine residents who responded reported that moonlighting would be necessary
in response to their financial needs and that more than a third presently moonlight
in order to supplement their income); Gaba & Howard, supra note 60, at 1253
(“Incentives to moonlight are strong for residents because many have enormous
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might exacerbate challenges resulting from long work hours and lack
of sleep.
There are also concerns that even when work hour guidelines are
followed, residents may still lack adequate sleep because of the
64
lifestyle activities while away from the hospital. Not only are there
problems with inadequate levels of sleep, but also with erratic
schedules and sleeping patterns of residents. Residents must contend
with circadian disruptions, a challenge said to be severe for residents
65
in training. Inadequate sleep may affect the level of performance of
66
residents already challenged by their inexperience. Studies in sleep
laboratories report that for residents, “both at base line and after
on-call duty, levels of daytime sleepiness are similar to or higher than
67
those in patients suffering from narcolepsy or sleep apnea.” Fatigue
68
and exhaustion may also foster resentment toward patients.
educational debts.”); Kazzi et al., supra note 52, at 1402, 1404 (noting that
moonlighting among residents is common, and is important source of income due to
low salaries, long delays into financial stability, and education debt); MI Langdorf et
al., National Survey of Emergency Medicine Resident Moonlighting, 2 ACAD. EMERGENCY
MED. 308 (1995) (reporting findings that nearly half of residents surveyed stated that
they moonlighted in some way). The topic of moonlighting is specifically addressed
in the current ACGME guidelines. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, VI.D,
at 8-9 (including internal moonlighting as part of the resident’s eighty-hour weekly
limit). The practice of moonlighting by residents has also come under criticism by
specialty segments in the profession. See Keim & Chisholm, supra note 22, at 927
(reporting the Society for Academic Medicine and the Council of Emergency
Medicine Residency Directors’ position on moonlighting as “not an activity that is
consistent philosophically with the missions of residency training nor academic
emergency medicine”); see also Carey Chisolm & Brigitte Baumann, SAEM Board of
Directors, SAEM Position Statement on the Qualifications for Unsupervised Emergency
Department Care, 7 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 929 (2000); Samuel Keim, CORD Board of
Directors, CORD Position Statement on Moonlighting, 7 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 929
(2000).
64. Andrew W. Gefell, Dying to Sleep: Using Federal Legislation and Tort Law to Cure
the Effects of Fatigue in Medical Residency Programs, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 645, 650-52 (2003);
Horowitz, supra note 59.
65. Gaba & Howard, supra note 60, at 1253 (discussing the circadian effects of
clockwise shift rotation).
66. See Gaba & Howard, supra note 60, at 1249, 1254 (noting that “[f]atigue is a
common complaint of house staff, and many trainees (forty-one percent) say they
have made errors that they attribute to fatigue”). Gaba and Howard report that “[i]n
the United States, medical professionals, especially residents, are working far beyond
the limits that society deems acceptable in other sectors,” a practice that “is
incompatible with a safe, high-quality health care system.” Id. at 1254. One national
survey conducted in 1991 found that forty-one percent of residents attributed a cause
of their most serious mistake to fatigue. KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 7. Numerous
studies have shown that “[w]ell-rested physicians consistently outperform their sleepdeprived counterparts in tests of memory, concentration, mathematical skills, visual
attention, electrocardiogram interpretation, and anesthesia monitoring.” Id. at 6-7
(footnotes omitted).
67. See Gaba & Howard, supra note 60, at 1249 (finding that sleep studies clearly
demonstrate that fatigue increases depression, anxiety, confusion, and anger, as well
as impairs psychomotor ability).
68. See KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 6 (observing that residency programs often
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Ironically, although compliance with limitations on resident work
hours may afford greater opportunities for sleep, some senior
physicians complain that limitations on residents’ presence at the
hospital may foster less preparation or engagement by residents in
69
cases, thereby undercutting the residents’ educational experience,
and one might suspect, the continuity of patient care. There is also a
question of how effectively or consistently senior physicians fulfill
their responsibility to supervise residents in connection with patient
70
care activities.
So here it is in a capsule. Residents provide a lot of the health care
in the United States. For the first time they number over 100,000
71
strong. They may also pull a laboring oar in hospital emergency
72
rooms.
The federal government is a major financial engine
73
Moreover, the
sustaining robust residency training programs.
quantum of medical services provided by residents is likely to increase
in the future since statistical evidence suggests that an ever greater
percentage of recent medical school graduates are pursuing

disillusion residents and cause them to lose sight of the altruistic reasons many
initially pursued medicine).
69. See Horowitz, supra note 59.
70. See Reuter, supra note 40, at 489 (“[H]ouse staff are frequently either
marginally supervised or unsupervised as they care for patients, particularly at night
and in busy emergency room situations . . . . The combination of inexperience,
stress, and poor supervision result in a significant number of negligent acts by house
staff.”). Id.
71. See Brotherton, Rockey & Etzel, supra note 34, at 1076 (noting that the
increase in the number of residents is probably a function of two factors: the overall
increase in the number of physicians, and the tendency of physicians to enter
medical specialties); see generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, U.S. SENATE, PHYSICIAN
WORKFORCE—PHYSICIAN SUPPLY INCREASED IN METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN
AREAS BUT GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES PERSISTED 2 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN], available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04124.pdf. This report stated
the following:
The number of physicians in the United States increased about 26 percent
from 1991 to 2001, twice as much as the nation’s population. The average
number of physicians per 100,000 people rose from 214 in 1991 to 239 in
2001 and the mix of generalists and specialists in the national physician
workforce remained about one-third generalists and two-thirds specialists.
Id.
72. Even the courts seem resigned to this reality. See Rush v. Akron Gen. Hosp.,
171 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (stating that “there is nothing sinister in
the employment by hospitals of interns to render emergency treatment to any
patient of the hospital”).
73. See GAO REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, supra note 71, at 5 (“The bulk of federal
dollars to support physician education is through Medicare’s graduate medical
education (GME) payments to teaching hospitals, which totaled an estimated $7.8
billion in 2000, the latest year for which data were available.”). The distributions are
made to the teaching hospital based on the number of physicians trained and
Medicare’s portion of the patients in the hospital. Id.
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74

specialties and subspecialties. But residents are not only delivering
medical services, they are also in learning mode. There is tension
inherent in a resident’s role because in order to learn they must
practice, meaning their “practice” involves “practice.” We have here
two goals, education and patient care, reified contrapuntally in
medical residents.
II. OVERVIEW OF VARIOUS APPROACHES IN THE COURTS
A. Standard of Care for Post-Graduate Medical Learners
The standard of care in medical malpractice cases is based on two
core principles in negligence law: first, that negligence liability is
fault-based (rather than strict liability) and therefore requires proof
that the defendant’s conduct was substandard, and second, that a
person’s conduct should be evaluated according to objective criteria,
75
rather than by a subjective assessment. I have previously described
the professional standard of care as follows:
[T]his objective standard in malpractice has usually been defined
in terms of a professionally oriented standard that encompasses the
teachings and practices of the medical profession. Yet the courts
and legislatures have differed on the form that such a
professionally oriented standard should take, and on the extent to
which they should defer to the practices of the medical profession
in defining the relevant standard. Under one common traditional
construct, the standard of care for physicians was defined . . . in
terms of “custom” or customary practices and medical lore. Under
a customary practice orientation, the focus was upon what had
customarily been done. The standard of care for malpractice
purposes has increasingly been addressed by statute. Although few
statutes have expressly defined the standard in terms of custom or
customary practice, numerous statutes contain language that seems
(if taken literally) to focus on a standard based on what conduct or
course has traditionally been followed, and thus are at least
74. See id. at 7 (estimating that, in 2001, the number of generalists was 87 per
100,000 people, and the number of specialists was 150 per 100,000 people, thus
generalists represented 87 ÷ 239 = 36.4% of physicians whereas specialists were 150 ÷
239, or 62.8%). The GAO’s classification system significantly understates the
prevalence of specialists because it categorized physicians whose specialty
information was listed as family practice, general practice, general internal medicine,
and general pediatrics as generalists rather than specialists. Id. at 17-18.
75. See Joseph H. King, Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective Standard
of Care in Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 49, 49 (1999) (“[O]bjective means
according to some external referent or test . . . . By contrast, a subjective evaluation
would have an internal perspective, evaluating a person’s conduct in terms of his
individual capabilities.”).
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consistent with a customary practice perspective. A number of
statutes articulate the standard in a way that, at least facially, seems
more demanding and normative than the customary practice
formulation. Instead of custom or habit, the standard of care is
couched in terms suggesting a level of care expected of reasonable
members of the defendant’s profession and specialty. A number of
cases, while retaining a professionally based perspective, have
expressly rejected custom as a conclusive test . . . . Frequently, the
professionally based standards have been defined not only in terms
of professional practices (whether tied to customary or reasonably
expected practices) but also with a geographic frame of reference,
although some states have, to varying degrees, adopted a national
standard. Moreover, the applicable professional standards are
usually those that existed at the time the alleged negligent conduct
76
occurred.

As noted above, some state statutes address aspects of medical
malpractice liability, including the standard of care. Although these
provisions vary in their particularity, usually the standard of care
provisions have been sufficiently general to essentially leave the
question of the standard of care for residents largely up to the courts,
albeit sometimes under the cover of “statutory construction.” For
present purposes, this Article will not attempt to survey the multiform
state statutory provisions.
Although the standard of care for physicians and other
professional health care providers has generally been governed by
negligence law and accordingly largely depends on the existence of
substandard conduct as determined by objective criteria, there has
always been a certain “precariousness” in the fault-based and
77
objective principles within the medical malpractice context. This
wavering and tentativeness is also evident in cases addressing the
question of the appropriate formulation for the standard of care for
medical residents.
Really, this should come as no surprise.
Negligence law has long been solicitous of children, for example,
cutting them some slack to reflect the fact that children are often
learning their way and are incapable of exercising the same level of
78
knowledge and care as adults in similar circumstances. At the same
76. Id. at 51-54 (footnotes omitted). For background, see generally Joseph H.
King, In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The ‘Accepted Practice’
Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
77. See King, supra note 75, at 50.
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 10
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (stating that unless the child is under five or
engaging in adult activities, the child is subject to the standard of children “of the
same age, intelligence, and experience . . .”); see generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 124 (2000) (explaining in detail the negligence standards applicable to
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time, however, children who engage in so-called adult activities are
often held to the same standard as that expected of an adult under
79
This ambivalence is also apparent in the
similar circumstances.
cases dealing with medical residents, who in a sense are also learners.
With residents, the lines are less clearly delineated and the courts in
less agreement.
The case law with respect to the standard of care for residents has
80
been sparse and in general less than lucid. There are a number of
explanations for this state of affairs. First, although residents are
81
increasingly named in malpractice cases, the most visible target
defendants continue to be the attending or supervising physicians (or
more experienced on-call physicians) and hospitals that sponsor or
82
employ the resident. This has tended to divert or at least blur the
focus from the matter of precisely how residents’ professional
conduct should be assessed. Second, there is sometimes ambiguity or
lack of precision with the terminology referring to residents. At one
time, the medical community commonly used the term “resident” to
refer to doctors who had been licensed and were engaged in training
to become board certified specialists, while the term “intern” was
used to refer to not-yet-fully-licensed medical school graduates who
were in training required as a precondition to obtaining a medical
license to practice medicine independently. Today, reflecting the
lead of the AMA, a single monolithic term, resident, is the
recommended usage to refer to all physicians engaged in graduate
medical education and training, thus including both licensed
residents and not-yet-fully-licensed residents (“interns”). To avoid
confusion, I will organize the following overview of the cases into two
83
main categories: not-yet-fully-licensed residents (who were formerly
called “interns”), and licensed residents (who have thus completed

children).
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 10
(stating that children are treated as adults when engaging in dangerous adult
activities, such as operating a motor vehicle).
80. See Jistarri v. Nappi, 549 A.2d 210, 214 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (noting at
the time that there was a “dearth of case law on the standard of care to be applied to
a resident”). Even so, the court was able to come up with examples of cases in which
courts have applied each of the broad standards. Id.
81. See Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 27, at 1052 (noting that statistics from a
malpractice insurer that covers multiple teaching hospitals showed that “resident
physicians were named in 22% of claims between 1994 and 2003”).
82. See id. at 1053-55.
83. I hedge here with the “fully” qualification to allow for the possibility that a
medical graduate may be authorized to engage in a limited practice for a time prior
to completing his internship, which may be a prerequisite to becoming “fully”
licensed so he might engage in independent practice of medicine.
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their so-called “internship” and are pursuing training to become a
specialist).
1.

Not-yet-fully-licensed residents
There appear to be fewer malpractice cases involving not-yetlicensed residents than licensed residents. This should come as no
surprise since not-yet-fully-licensed residents are less numerous than
licensed residents because the training required for licensure is
84
usually one to three years, whereas the overall residency training
typically spans a number of years, typically three to seven. In
addition, first-year, not-yet-fully-licensed residents are subject to more
direct and continuous supervision, and generally undertake more
routine, less complex medical procedures.
For a representative fact pattern, we can turn to the case of Rush v.
85
Akron General Hospital where a not-yet-fully-licensed resident serving
86
in a hospital emergency room treated a patient who had been
pushed through a glass door. This resident allegedly closed the
patient’s wounds without probing them. As a result, he therefore
failed to detect two pieces of glass (one 3 1/4 inches long) lodged in
the patient’s shoulder. Here the resident was not sued individually,
thus the court was called upon to decide whether the resident
physician was negligent, thereby subjecting his hospital-employer to
87
vicarious liability. That question in turn required that the court
consider the underlying legal question of the standard of care by
which this doctor’s conduct in the emergency room should be
evaluated. The Rush court adopted a fairly subjective formulation,
one tied to the care that interns ordinarily possess under similar
88
circumstances, but as we shall see, the cases are divided.
84. See JAMA Patient Page, supra note 33.
85. 171 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
86. He was assigned to the hospital emergency room on a 24-hour tour of duty.
Id. at 380.
87. See id. at 381. On the merits, following a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial
judge entered a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict which was
affirmed on appeal. Id. (finding that “the evidence does not show the intern to have
exercised any lesser degree of skill, care, and diligence than that required of a
general practitioner working in this community; and, as a consequence malpractice
was not proved”).
88. See id. at 381 (holding that interns were expected to possess and exercise
“such skill and use such care and diligence in the handling of emergency cases as
capable medical college graduates serving hospitals as interns ordinarily possess
under similar circumstances,” and explaining that “[i]t would be unreasonable to
exact from an intern, doing emergency work in a hospital, that high degree of skill
which is impliedly possessed by a physician . . . in the general practice of his
profession, with an extensive and constant practice in hospitals and the
community”).
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About the only safe generalization about the standard of care for
not-yet-fully-licensed residents is that they are not entitled to a free
pass merely because of their status as not-yet-licensed residents. In
89
Mercil v. Mathers, a claim was brought by the estate of a woman who
died shortly after giving birth. Dr. Powell, a first-year, not-yet-licensed
90
resident, who assisted with the delivery, was among the defendants.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Powell and
certain other defendants, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the remaining defendants. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the trial
court’s decision to dismiss the claim against Dr. Powell. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed and reversed for a new trial. Dr.
Powell argued that because of his not-yet-licensed resident status he
91
could not be liable.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with this
conclusion, responding:
Dr. Powell’s status as a first-year unlicensed family practice resident
does not shelter him from all legal duty, as the trial court
ruled . . . .
Although doctors cannot be licensed until they
complete their first year of residency, they can treat patients during
that time. If medical personnel provide treatment to patients, they
have some duty towards those patients. The general standard of
care provides that a doctor must “use that degree of skill and
learning which is normally possessed and used by doctors in good
standing in a similar practice . . . . This flexible standard can
92
accommodate a doctor’s status as an unlicensed resident.”

The court elaborated:
Although Dr. Powell’s level of responsibility was not the same as
that of the obstetricians, he clearly bore some duty towards the
decedent. Resolution of any question of negligence in such a case
should not have been handled by dismissing Dr. Powell before trial.
Rather, the jury should have been given the opportunity—aided by
the expert testimony that was proffered—to determine if Dr.
Powell was negligent under the standard of care applicable to an
93
unlicensed first-year resident.
89. No. C3-93-140, 1994 WL 1114 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 1994), rev’d on other
grounds, 517 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1994).
90. Note that this is a “first-year resident” in the current sense of the AMA
definition, i.e., an “intern” under the old terminology. See discussion supra note 30
(explaining the changes in terminology pertaining to medical residents).
91. Mercil, 1994 WL 1114, at *4. This was apparently what the trial court meant
when it said that Dr. Powell “‘was basically an observer and helper . . . clearly under
the direction of other [d]efendant physicians.’” Id.
92. Id. (internal citations omitted).
93. Id. at *5; see Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 698 N.W.2d 643, 655 (Wis.
2005) (stating that even under a more subjective formulation, as discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 97-101, a not-yet-fully-licensed resident did not enjoy
immunity or automatically escape liability).
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Thus, residents, even residents who are not-yet-fully-licensed, are
not immune from legal scrutiny of their professional conduct or from
concomitant potential tort liability. But, this, of course, leaves the
question, by what legal standard is resident conduct to be tested?
The sparse case law has yielded divergent opinions on the standard
of care. Some cases hold not-yet-fully-licensed residents to the
standard of care applicable to licensed non-specialists, or in other
94
words general practitioners. Cases following this approach seldom
articulate a clear rationale for their rule. One suspects these cases
reflect an overriding concern with patient safety. Perhaps they are
analogous to the same animus that explains why children engaging in
95
adult activities are often held to an adult standard.
Other courts have applied a formulation to not-yet-fully-licensed
residents that is somewhat more subjective. Although the language
of these courts varies, the underlying rule requires such residents to
exercise that level of knowledge and care expected of other
practitioners at a similar stage in their post-medical school education
96
and training.
A recent example of this similar-stage, same-class-

94. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 1390, 1392 (W.D. Tex. 1985)
(applying Texas law and stating that the intern was subject to the standard of care for
a “physician,” presumably meaning a non-specialist or general practitioner
physician); Centman v. Cobb, 581 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ind. App. 1991) (holding that
not-yet-licensed resident, or “interns,” are held to the standard of care of physicians,
and stating that thus, “[r]egardless of whether Drs. Cobb and Garner were also called
interns or first-year residents, they were practitioners of medicine required to
exercise the same standard of care applicable to physicians with unlimited licenses to
practice”); Davis v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., No. 204523, 1999 WL 33438841, at *1
(Mich. Ct. App. July 9, 1999) (stating that “[i]nterns and residents are
nonspecialists,” and suggesting that they are held to the standard of general
practitioners); Bahr v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 497 N.W.2d 526, 528 (Mich. App. 1993)
(stating that since interns and residents were not specialists, they were held to the
same geographic frame of reference as general practitioners), rev’d on other grounds,
528 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. 1995)
95. See infra notes 230-232 and accompanying text (discussing the standard for
children engaged in dangerous activities).
96. See, e.g., Mercil, 1994 WL 1114, at *4-5 (stating in a claim against a not-yetlicensed resident, or in other words an intern, that the general standard of care
requiring a doctor to exercise the skill and learning which is “‘normally possessed
and used by doctors in good standing in a similar practice,’” and that “[t]his flexible
standard can accommodate a doctor’s status as an unlicensed resident” who is to be
held to the standard of care of an unlicensed, first-year resident) (internal citations
omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 517 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1994); Rush v. Akron Gen.
Hosp., 171 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (holding that interns were
expected to possess and exercise the degree of skill and care in emergency cases as
capable medical college graduates and explaining that it would be unreasonable to
expect from an intern, doing emergency work in a hospital, the same level of skill
which is possessed by a physician in the general practice of his profession); Phelps,
698 N.W.2d at 655 (holding in connection with a malpractice claim against a not-yetfully-licensed, first-year resident, that such resident was subject to the standard of
care expected of unlicensed first year residents).
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based rule is found in Phelps v. Physicians Insurance Company. The
parents brought a malpractice claim against a not-yet-licensed, first98
year resident, and the hospital, seeking to recover damages for the
death of their unborn son. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
not-yet-licensed residents should be held to the standard of care
99
expected of an unlicensed first-year resident. The court emphasized
that its rule was “based on the unique restrictions” imposed on such
100
residents and their “unique status.”
The court also took pains to
101
emphasize that its standard did not mean “a grant of immunity” for
such residents.
2.

Licensed residents and other licensed physicians engaged in graduate
medical education
For present purposes, “licensed residents” will refer to physicians
who have not only completed their traditional medical school
education, but have also completed the training—usually consisting
of an at least one-year “internship”—required to become fully
102
103
licensed to practice medicine. Licensed residents and fellows are
generally participating in a formal graduate medical education
(“GME”) residency program through a sponsoring hospital in order
for them to become “board certified” in a recognized medical
specialty or subspecialty. Most courts would hold such residents to at
least the same level of care as that demanded of licensed general

97. 698 N.W.2d 643.
98. Id. at 647. The court of appeals stated that the defendant “was not a licensed
physician” but “an unlicensed medical-college graduate who was undergoing his
‘postgraduate training of 12 months in a facility approved by the’ Medical Examining
Board, as a precondition to licensure.” Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 681
N.W.2d 571, 582 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 698 N.W.2d 643.
99. Phelps, 698 N.W.2d at 655.
100. See id. (stating that although the resident could refer to himself as an “M.D.,”
his authority and freedom of action was limited and more restricted than that of a
fully licensed practitioner). Specifically, the court noted that the defendant had no
authority to provide primary obstetrical care or to act as the primary attending
physician. Id. Rather, his primary duty was to assess and report findings and
differential diagnoses to upper level physicians. Id.
101. Id. The court noted that such residents might still be found negligent in
accordance with the provision of “sophisticated health care services appropriate to
their ‘in training’ status” or where for example, “they undertook to treat outside the
scope of their authority and expertise, or they failed to consult with someone more
skilled and experienced when the standard of care required it.” Id. at 656. And,
indeed, in the instant case the court refused to disturb a finding by the trial court
that the resident had been negligent in failing to move the pregnant patient to
Labor and Delivery and to contact more senior staff or the attending physician. Id. at
656-57.
102. See supra notes 30-33, 83-84 (explaining medical residency).
103. On “fellow” status, see supra note 30.
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practitioners. That said, we still have the question of whether that is
all, or may such residents also be held to a more demanding
standard.
Consider the following illustration:
[A] patient . . . [complains of] chest pain and is seen by a first-year
[cardiology] resident physician. The resident physician reads the
patient’s electrocardiogram (ECG) to the best of his ability—in
fact, the interpretation is at least as good as one would expect of a
resident physician at this level—but his reading misses a subtle
finding that the average attending [cardiologist] would not have
missed. Believing that the patient does not have a cardiac etiology
of pain, the resident physician sends the patient home without
treatment. He does not consult an attending physician; the ECG
reading seems straightforward so that it is not obvious that
supervision should be sought in the situation. The patient later
dies of a myocardial infarction. In this case, has the resident
physician met his duty of due care of appropriately interpreting the
105
ECG?

If the resident were sued in a wrongful death claim for medical
malpractice, how should a jury be instructed on the relevant standard
of care to which such a resident should be held? As summarized
below, the cases have not agreed on the answer. Moreover, in some
jurisdictions, the issue of whether a practitioner is deemed a specialist
may affect the geographic frame of reference of the standard of care.
This is because whether or not some jurisdictions apply a version of
locality rule in connection with the standard of care may depend on
106
whether the defendant was a general practitioner or specialist.
At least three different positions are evident in the cases. Some
courts hold licensed residents to the standard of care applicable to
licensed generalists (general practitioners), or in other words to
107
licensed, non-specialist standards. This approach can be illustrated
104. Ward, supra note 28, at 289; see Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 27, at 1052;
see also Reuter supra note 40, at 490 (noting that residents are usually held to at least
the standard of general practitioners “even though most do not obtain a license to
practice medicine until the completion of their first year”).
105. Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 27, at 1052 (as modified in brackets).
106. See, e.g., Bahr v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 497 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Mich. App. 1993)
(stating that since interns and residents were not specialists, they were held to the
same geographic rule that applied to general practitioners), rev’d on other grounds,
528 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. 1995) For background, see generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW 265 (2d ed. 2000).
107. See McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1972) (applying Hawaii
law and holding that a resident who had completed one-and-a-half years of a
cardiology residency program was not to be evaluated by “an after-the-fact assessment
of what one could expect from a doctor with comparable training and practice,” but
instead apparently by the standard applicable to a general licensed physician staffing
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108

by the wrongful death case of McBride v. United States. A patient who
had been treated at the hospital three days earlier for chest pain,
returned again, experiencing severe chest pain. He was seen in the
emergency room by a licensed resident who had completed his oneyear “internship” and had in addition also completed about one-anda-half additional years of his residency program in cardiology. Based
on his examination and the patient’s electrocardiogram, the resident
(although recommending hospitalization) acquiesced in the patient’s
preference not to be hospitalized, and did not insist that he be
hospitalized. The patient died shortly after reaching home.
At trial, the resident admitted that he had misinterpreted the
decedent-patient’s EKG, but the Chief of Cardiology at the hospital
testified that many residents would not have recognized the abnormal
109
EKG tracings. Plaintiffs introduced expert testimony that “general
110
The trial
practitioners” would have read the EKG accurately.
judge’s comments suggested that he believed the resident’s conduct
should be evaluated on the basis of what one would expect of a
111
“young resident” with similar training.
In reversing, the court of
appeals held that the standard of care does not vary according to the
doctor’s “individual knowledge or education,” and should not
depend on “an after-the-fact assessment of what one could expect
112
from a doctor with comparable training and practice.” Rather the
court suggested that a resident who had completed one-and-a-half
years of a cardiology residency program should instead be subject to
the standard applicable to a general licensed physician (presumably a
113
general practitioner) staffing an emergency room.
A number of other courts have taken a different approach. These
courts essentially hold that the standard of care for licensed residents
is based on a sliding scale. Residents are evaluated in accordance
an emergency room); Davis v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., No. 204523, 1999 WL 33438841,
at *1, 5 (Mich. App. July 9, 1999) (stating that interns and residents are
“nonspecialists” and, thus, are held to the standard applicable to general
practitioners); Bahr, 497 N.W.2d at 527 (stating that since interns and residents were
not specialists, they were held to the same geographic frame of reference as general
practitioners), rev’d on other grounds, 528 N.W.2d 170; Baccari v. Donat, 741 A.2d 262,
264 (R.I. 1999) (holding the resident to the “same duty of care as other physicians”
with “unlimited licenses,” which presumably meant a general practitioner although
the opinion is not entirely clear on that).
108. 462 F.2d 72.
109. See id. at 74.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 74 & n.2 (contending that the resident’s performance should be viewed
“against the backdrop of his lack of special training and experience”).
112. Id. at 74.
113. Id. (reversing the trial court’s dismissal because it was based on an incorrect
standard).
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with others in the same type of residency program and at the same
114
stage. Take, for example, the case of Sullins v. University Hospital of
115
The sixty-two-year-old patient had been admitted to the
Cleveland.
hospital for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis. Because of her
past exposure to tuberculosis and reactor status, the attending
physician requested an infectious disease consultation.
This
consultation was provided by defendant, Dr. Woolley, an infectious
disease fellow in training at the hospital. The patient lapsed into a
coma and died several days later. Plaintiffs alleged that the fellow was
negligent in undertaking the consultation on his own and in failing
to timely diagnose the patient’s condition, which turned out to be
tuberculosis meningitis.
A jury returned a verdict in favor of the hospital in the claim
against it for the alleged negligence of the fellow, Dr. Woolley, a
116
verdict based on a failure to find that Dr. Woolley was negligent. In
affirming, the court of appeals approved an instruction by the trial
court that “the existence of a fellow physician-patient relationship
imposes on the fellow physician the duty to act as would a fellow
physician of ordinary skill, care and diligence at the same stage of his
117
training under like or similar circumstances.”
Elaborating, the
114. See, e.g., Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d 309, 314-15 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying
Oklahoma law and stating that with respect to a physician who had completed three
years of a four-year residency in general surgery, “it would have been improper to
hold [a general practitioner] to a standard of an orthopedic surgeon, inasmuch as
he was not board certified in that specialty” and had not held himself out as an
orthopedist, but he “was properly held to a higher standard of care than that
required of a general practitioner” given “his additional training and expertise”);
Sullins v. Univ. Hosp. of Clevland, No. 80444, 2003 WL 195076, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 28, 2003) (approving an instruction by the trial court that “the existence of a
fellow physician-patient relationship imposes on the fellow physician the duty to act
as would a fellow physician of ordinary skill, care and diligence at the same stage of
his training under like or similar circumstances,” and stating that “[f]or doctors in
training (interns, residents or fellows), the standard of care is that of a doctor of
ordinary skill, care and diligence at the same stage of his training, under like or
similar circumstances”); Maurer v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 614 A.2d 754, 758 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (stating in dicta that “[t]he standard of care to be applied to a resident is
an intermediate one, higher than that for a general practitioner but less than that for
a fully trained specialist”); Jistarri v. Nappi, 549 A.2d 210, 214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(holding that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury to apply to the
orthopedic resident “a standard of care higher than that for general practitioners but
less than that for fully trained orthopedic specialists”); Fullerton v. Sacred Heart
Med. Ctr., No. 19579-I-III, 2003 WL 21154151, at *3-4 (Wash. App. May 20, 2003)
(holding with respect to a third-year radiology resident that the trial court correctly
instructed the jury “that radiology residents have a duty to comply with the standard
of care for the profession or class to which they belong,” and noting that the
standard in the state was measured against a “yardstick of reasonable prudence”), rev.
denied, 87 P.3d 1184 (Wash. 2004).
115. 2003 WL 195076.
116. Id. at *4.
117. Id. at *5.
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court of appeals framed the standard of care as follows: “For doctors
in training (interns, residents or fellows), the standard of care is that
of a doctor of ordinary skill, care and diligence at the same stage of
118
his training, under like or similar circumstances.”
Some other cases have held licensed residents to a specialist
119
This approach is well illustrated by the case of
standard of care.
120
Powers v. United States.
The patient underwent cervical fusion

118. Id. The Sullins rule was recently extended to the persons in training to
practice dentistry and dental specialties. See Tarellari v. Case W. Res. Univ. Sch. of
Dentistry, No. 84892, 2005 WL 1120007, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 2005) (holding
that for a third-year undergraduate student of general dentistry and for a dentist in
his second-year of graduate studies in endodontics, the standard of care is that of
third-year students of general dentistry and second-year graduate students of
endodontics respectively).
119. See Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1099-1101 (D. Conn. 1984)
(suggesting that in a Federal Tort Claims Act case applying Connecticut law, a firstyear orthopedic resident did “specialize in orthopedics” and was subject to the
standard of care of other physicians “in the same line of practice” and in “similar
cases” in the relevant geographic frame of reference with respect to the
postoperative evaluation and care of the patient, and further holding even though
the resident “lacked the experience necessary to recognize the severity of [the
patient’s] condition and the need for immediate corrective action,” his “failure to
attempt additional diagnostic or surgical procedures at this stage constituted a
breach of the standard of care”); Harrigan v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 177, 185
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that for the purposes of the federal government’s liability
based on the alleged negligence by a licensed resident in urology, a resident “acting
within his specialty in urology” is held to the standard of care applicable to
specialists); Valentine v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 15 Cal. Rptr. 26, 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961) (approving instruction holding resident to the standard and “duty of
possessing that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by specialists of good
standing practicing,” and stating that although defendant-resident “had only
completed one-third of his residency, it would not seem at all unreasonable to hold
him to a higher standard of skill than that required of the general practitioner”),
overruled on other grounds, Siverson v. Weber, 372 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1962); Parmelee v.
Kline, 579 So. 2d 1008, 1016 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a first-year neurology
resident who was limiting her practice to neurosurgery and was holding herself out
as a specialist in that area was classified as a specialist for purposes of determining
the appropriate standard of care); Felice v. Valleylab, Inc., 520 So. 2d 920, 928 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1987) (holding that for the purposes of the vicarious liability of the
employer of a third-year resident in surgery who held herself out as limiting her
practice to surgery, she was held to the standard of a specialist, namely a surgeon);
St. Germain v. Pfeifer, 637 N.E.2d 848, 852 (Mass. 1994) (implying that a first-year
orthopedic resident, presumably a licensed resident, should be held to the same
standards as other “more senior physicians,” which seems to imply a specialist
standard although the opinion is not clear, an indecisiveness underscored in a later
case discussed infra note 131); Pratt v. Stein, 444 A.2d 674, 708 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(stating that for the purpose of the vicarious liability of the hospital-employer of a
licensed resident, a resident “should be held to the standard of a specialist when the
resident is acting within his field of specialty”); Baccari v. Donat, 741 A.2d 262, 264
(R.I. 1999) (holding a resident to the “same duty of care as other physicians” with
“unlimited licenses,” which presumably means to a specialist standard, although the
opinion is not explicit nor clear on this). For more recent cases applying
Pennsylvania law and reaching a different conclusion, see supra note 114 (applying an
apparent intermediate standard).
120. 589 F. Supp. 1084 (applying Connecticut law).
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surgery at a Veterans Association hospital.
An experienced
orthopedic surgeon supervised three licensed residents during the
surgery. One of these residents, Dr. Biondino, was a first-year
orthopedic resident who testified that the surgery was his first time
performing a cervical fusion procedure for this type of problem.
Nevertheless, he was, according to the court’s assessment of the
121
operative report, “functionally . . . the surgeon.”
In fact, Dr.
Biondino and another resident operated on the patient’s neck at the
fusion site while the supervising surgeon and another resident
operated on the patient’s leg to harvest bone for the bone graft.
Also, Dr. Biondino was primarily responsible for the post-operative
122
care of the patient for about a month. The patient suffered severe
morbidity from the surgery, including partial paralysis of the upper
123
extremity. Apparently, his spine was fused at an excessively forward
124
angle so that his spinal cord became impinged.
The court found that the surgical fusion was performed negligently
125
and that the postoperative care of the patient “did not measure up.”
Importantly, although the court’s language was ambiguous, it
suggested that the inexperienced surgical resident, Dr. Biondino, was
being held to the standard of care applicable to a specialist—an
orthopedic surgeon. The court noted that the first-year orthopedic
126
resident did “specialize in orthopedics” and was subject to the
127
standard of care of other physicians “in the same line of practice”
and “exercised in similar cases” in the relevant geographic frame of
128
reference.
Thus, the court found that the performance of the
cervical fusion surgery failed to satisfy the standard of care. And, with
respect to the postoperative evaluation and care of the patient, even
though Dr. Biondino “lacked the experience necessary to recognize
121. Id. at 1091. The senior attending orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Raycroft, “testified
that at the time of the operation he mistakenly believed that Dr. Biondino was a
third-year orthopedic resident. He was not aware that Dr. Biondino was only a
first-year orthopedic resident until the time of trial.” Id.
122. Id. at 1095.
123. Id. The defendant-resident Dr. Biondino attempted to explain the patient’s
worsening condition on a psychological basis as hysteria. Id. at 1094-95. The court
rejected that contention, choosing to rely instead on objective evidence that the illfated surgery caused the patient’s condition. Those objective bases included not
only five electromyography tests measuring nerve root damage by electrodes, but also
included the patient’s submitting to a sodium amytal interview which indicated the
paralysis was real and not caused by psychological or hysterical factors. Id. at 1097.
124. Id. at 1096.
125. Id. at 1100-01 (stating that “the surgeons who performed the plaintiff’s fusion
failed to adequately take into account his unique, pre-fusion spinal condition”).
126. Id. at 1101.
127. Id. at 1099.
128. Id. at 1100.
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the severity of [the patient’s] condition and the need for immediate
129
corrective action,” his “failure to attempt additional diagnostic or
surgical procedures at this stage constituted a breach of a standard of
130
care.”
There are also a fair number of cases involving treatment
administered by licensed medical residents in which the nature of the
standard of care is unclear. Sometimes the courts deliberately refuse
131
to decide the legal issue. And, in other cases, the court’s language
is unclear on precisely what the applicable legal formulation for the
standard of care is for licensed residents. Thus, in National Bank of
132
Commerce v. Quirk, medical malpractice claims were brought for
alleged spinal cord injuries to a newborn as a result of treatment
during and following pregnancy and delivery. The plaintiffs sued ten
physicians employed by the University of Arkansas for Medical
Sciences. Two of those physician-defendants were licensed medical
residents in radiology who were alleged to have misread an MRI.
They both moved for summary judgment, contending that the
plaintiffs had failed to present expert testimony showing that their
conduct had deviated from the standard of care for residents in
133
training.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of these two residents.
The Court variously stated that the plaintiffs were required to prove
the “applicable” or “required” standard of care, and that they had not
done so, noting that the testimony of one physician expert related to
the standard of care “for the staff radiologist,” and that he “admitted

129. Id. at 1101.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Jarry v. Corsaro, 666 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). In
Jarry, at some point during her hospitalization, the child, Anastasia, suffered brain
damage from lack of oxygen which resulted in a seizure disorder and mental
retardation. In the subsequent medical malpractice action, the jury determined that
the residents had not been negligent. Plaintiffs appealed, alleging “that the trial
judge erred in instructing the jury that Drs. Kessler and Lee were to be held to the
standard of care of a general practitioner.” Id. Plaintiffs contended that, “as second
and first-year residents respectively, [they] should have been held to a higher
standard of care because they (a) had received additional training in pediatric care,
and (b) held themselves out as specialists.” Id. at 13-14. The Massachusetts Court of
Appeals bypassed this argument and issue in a footnote, noting “that this case
presents the question of the standard of care required of residents and interns when
treating patients,” but that “neither this court, nor the Supreme Judicial Court, has
dealt squarely with the appropriate standard for residents beyond their first year of
residency.” Id. at 1014 n.4. The court declined to address the issue because the
plaintiffs had failed properly to preserve the issue for appeal.
132. 918 S.W.2d 138 (Ark. 1996).
133. Id. at 149.
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he did not know what the standard of care was for a resident.” The
Court then added vaguely that the plaintiffs had “not cited any
evidence in the record to support the theory that residents should be
135
held to the same standard as other licensed doctors.”
The problem with this statement is that whether residents should
be held to a particular standard is a legal issue for the court to decide
before the parties seek to establish factually whether that legal
standard of care, as formulated by the court, was violated. Thus, the
Court implied that residents were held to the same standard as other
“residents in training,” but did not explicitly or unequivocally decide
136
the question.
3.

Restatements
The current position of the Restatement of Torts on the question
of the standard of care for medical residents is ambiguous and does
not offer much guidance. The matter seems to have been consigned
to a silent interregnum between the Restatement (Second) and the
proposed final draft of the latest segment of the Restatement (Third)
137
that is under active
of Torts:
Liability for Physical Harm
consideration by the American law Institute (“ALI”). The black letter
of Section 299A of the Restatement (Second) approved in 1965,
which relates to “Undertaking in Profession or Trade,” provided that
“[u]nless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge,
one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession
or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally
possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in
138
similar communities.” Section 299A, however, does not address the
question of the standard of care of a learner who is silent and makes
no representations about possessing a specified level of skill or
knowledge.
The black letter language of the new Section 12 of the Restatement
(Third) is couched in more general terms, and states that “[i]f an
actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most
others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be taken into
account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a

134. Id. at 150.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 149-50.
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 2005).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
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reasonably careful person.”
The comments to Section 12 take a
different, somewhat more nuanced approach, stating:
A somewhat special case concerns learners or beginners. Just as
the law holds teenagers who choose to engage in adult activities to
adult standards despite their inexperience, so adults who choose to
engage in particular activities can properly be held to general
standards, even when they are learners. Yet while an actor’s status
as a learner is in general ignored, there can be relationships
between that actor and the other actor that attach significance to
this status. When, for example, the defendant, while learning to
drive, receives a lesson from the plaintiff, and when the
defendant’s inexperienced operation of the car causes an accident
that injures the plaintiff, the defendant’s status as a beginner is
taken into account in considering the defendant’s negligence and
hence the defendant’s liability. That status is ignored, however, if
the defendant is sued by a pedestrian injured in the same
140
accident.

Although both the broad language of Section 12 and the
accompanying Reporters’ Notes suggest that it could be applicable to
141
professional liability,
the new Section 12 apparently was not
intended to address professional liability. This limitation is evident
from the deliberations of the ALI at the meeting at which Section 12
was discussed, during which it became apparent that Section 12 was
142
intended to address exclusively nonprofessional negligence.
The
remarks of Professor Michael Green, one of the Reporters for the
new Third Restatement of Torts, concur that Section 12 was not
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 12.
140. Id. § 12 cmt. b.
141. See Norman L. Epstein, 2001 Proceedings, 78th Annual Meeting, American
law Institute 93 (Apr. 14, 2001). Justice Epstein stated:
The Reporters’ Note to Comment a makes a statement that this section “can
be easily applied to cases involving the liability of professionals,” and in fact,
the broad language that the black letter uses would include professionals,
because there is nothing in it that indicates that it would not. It is a broad,
generic provision, as I now read it.
Id.
142. During the Institute’s discussion of section 12, Justice Epstein cautioned:
It seems to me that the liability of professional persons and tradespersons as
well is so substantial that it deserves a particular and explicit statement in the
Restatement, so that we should either do this now . . . or we ought to
explicitly recognize that we are not treating it at this point and will treat it
later. I understand it is treated in the Law Governing Lawyers with respect to
attorney malpractice, but it does not appear to be explicitly treated in any
other way, except generically in this provision as it is now stated. It deserves
a separate statement, and for that reason I move that we either treat it in a
separate section or subdivision of this section or explicitly state that we are
not doing so now but will address it at some future time.
Id. at 93-94.
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applicable to professional medical negligence.
Accordingly, it
appears that the standard of care for professional medical negligence
will therefore continue for the time being to be covered by Section
299A of the Second Restatement, presumably at least until the matter
144
is explicitly addressed by a new section.
Turning then to Section 299A of the Second Restatement, we find
the following language:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge,
one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good
145
standing in similar communities.

143. The Proceedings state, as elaborated by my bracketed language which is
needed for Green’s comment to make sense:
Professor Green: Let me just add, there is a connection between this section,
§ 12, and the section in the Second Restatement that is referred to in that
Reporters’ Note, § 299A, but I think what we can do here . . . is to make it
clear that this speaks to the nonprofessional malpractice situation [and not
to the professional medical malpractice situation] for which § 299A exists
and remains until the project that Lance refers to comes into being and
conclusion.
Id. at 94; see also Temporary Summary Note to Section 12, 24 FALL ALI REP. 6, 6-7 (2001),
which states (again with bracketed rationalizing language added):
In response to a motion that the problem of professional and tradespersons’
negligence, treated in § 299A of the Restatement Second, be addressed in a
subdivision of this section, in a separate section, or at some future time, the
Reporter agreed to consider stating that this section [Section 12] speaks to
the nonprofessional malpractice situation for which § 299A was fashioned
and that § 299A continues to reflect the position of the Institute.
144. The Proceedings state:
Justice Epstein: The problem with doing it that way is that § 299A is
going to disappear from view, except as a matter of history. If what we are
going to present is the Restatement Third of Torts, then § 299A, if it is not
brought forward in some way, is something historical but is not included.
Now if you are suggesting an explicit statement that § 299A remains the
position of the Institute until it is addressed further, then that may be a little
awkward, but I think that would do the job, and, if that is what you are
suggesting, that would address my concerns.
Professor Green: Well, you are really raising an important question of
Institute policy that I don’t think any Reporters have it within their scope to
address. I can say that I think it has been the understanding of the
Reporters who have worked on various projects of the Third Restatement . . .
that whenever the day was done on the Third Restatement there would be
many provisions in the Second Restatement that remained and still spoke as
authoritatively as they ever did and would not be superseded by the Third
Restatement. That was our understanding, and I think this draft that you see
here is consistent with that understanding. Now that may or may not be able
to be effectuated, but that is the assumption[.]
Id. at 94-95.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
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This Section, which is applicable to physicians, explains that “[i]n
the absence of any such special representation, the standard of skill
and knowledge required of the actor who practices a profession or
trade is that which is commonly possessed by members of that
147
profession or trade in good standing.” Another comment suggests
that a person who represents that he has superior skill or knowledge
148
beyond that common to his profession be judged accordingly.
A
person may also, however, in the absence of a contrary
149
representation, “make it clear that he has less than the minimum of
skill common to the profession or trade; and in that case he is
150
required to exercise only the skill which he represents that he has.”
It is not clear whether this representing-the-standard-down option
was intended to be available to professionals, or only to laypersons
who have undertaken to perform a task normally reserved for
151
professionals.
In any case, the net effect of this convoluted stroll
through the Restatements is that the Restatement does not offer
much guidance on the problem. This is especially true where a
person—such as a medical resident—remains silent and says nothing
to the patient about his status.
B. Informed Consent and Other Information-Based Liability Theories
Most malpractice cases arising out of treatment by health care
providers who possess less experience or training than others
rendering similar medical services focus on the actual performance
of the treatment in question. Therefore, the question of the standard
146. Id. § 299A cmt. b (stating that “[i]t applies to any person who undertakes to
render services to another in the practice of a profession, such as that of physician or
surgeon, dentist, pharmacist, oculist, attorney, accountant, or engineer”).
147. Id. § 299A cmt. e.
148. Id. § 299A cmt. d. On the importance of representation, the Restatement sets
forth the following:
An actor undertaking to render services may represent that he has superior
skill or knowledge, beyond that common to his profession or trade. In that
event he incurs an obligation to the person to whom he makes such a
representation, to have, and to exercise, the skill and knowledge which he
represents himself to have. Thus a physician who holds himself out as a
specialist in certain types of practice is required to have the skill and
knowledge common to other specialists.
Id.
149. See id. (clarifying that “[t]he rule stated in this Section applies only where
there is no such special representation”).
150. Id.
151. The example used to illustrate this principle did not involve a physician. The
comment states: “Thus a layman who attempts to perform a surgical operation in an
emergency, in the absence of any surgeon, and who makes it clear that he does not
have the skill or knowledge of a surgeon, is not required to exercise such skill or
knowledge.” Id.
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of care for treatment purposes figures centrally in such cases. In
recent years, a second theory of liability has sometimes emerged in
this setting. This new kid on the block is the doctrine of informed
consent. This doctrine requires that a treating physician disclose the
material risks of the contemplated medical procedure to his or her
patient in order that the patient’s consent to the treatment be
152
“informed.”
Failing that, liability may be imposed on a nondisclosing doctor for the material risks of the medical procedure that
eventuate. The jurisdictions are divided on whether the required
disclosures should be determined in accordance with professionally
based standards of what a reasonable medical practitioner would be
expected to disclose, or by lay standards based on what information a
153
reasonable patient would deem material.
The profession-based
standard of disclosure usually results in a more limited scope of the
required disclosures because the duty to disclose then depends on
expert testimony on whether the applicable professional practices call
for the types of disclosure alleged by a plaintiff.
Although of comparatively recent vintage, the doctrine of
informed consent has become widely established in the United
154
States. The doctrine has not been without its skeptics, both during
155
156
There has also
its emergence, and continuing to the present.
152. See DOBBS, supra note 78, § 250, at 652-53 (exploring the principles
underlying informed consent doctrine including autonomy, self-determination,
“fundamental American values,” and medical ethics).
153. See id. at 655 (characterizing the medical standard of disclosure, established
via expert testimony of the professional standard, as the older “camp” supported by
case law and/or statutes in slightly more than half of states and tracing the origin of
the standard based on reasonable patient expectations to three 1972 decisions);
FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, at 313-14 (explaining the physician-based standard
and reasonable patient standard); Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Doctor, Are You
Experienced? The Relevance of Disclosure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent,
18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 373, 380-91 (2002) (comparing cases that adopted
the reasonable physician standard with those that adopted the reasonable patient
standard and concluding that despite a nationwide trend towards the patient
standard, the physician standard has retained its resiliency).
154. See Iheukwumere, supra note 153, at 375-80 (tracing the evolution of the
doctrine); Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 313, 315 (2002) (stating that “[i]n the latter half of the twentieth century, the
legal requirement of informed consent became well-established in all fifty states”).
In 2000, Georgia became the fiftieth state to accept the doctrine of informed
consent. Id. at 315 n.11.
155. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale? Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV.
137, 148 (1977) (questioning the level of disclosures physicians make to patients and
observing that “disclosure and consent . . . are obligations alien to medical
practice”); Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed
Consent: A Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 334 (1983)
(observing that “informed consent as envisioned by the courts is a relatively rare
phenomenon in the clinical settings that we have examined”); Aaron D. Twerski &
Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable
Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 648 (1988) (criticizing informed choice as a
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been some resistance in the medical profession to the spirit of
157
informed consent.
The doctrine continues to evolve. Some commentators have even
suggested that rather than attempt to expand the scope of informed
consent, a newly packaged autonomy interest should be recognized
158
to protect the patient’s right of informed decisionmaking.
One
“sanctionless tort” based on the authors’ contention that decision causation is not
justiciable in practice); Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s Uneasy
Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 751 (1986) (declaring that “the
law has been far richer in its rhetorical devotion to the ideal of patient selfdetermination than in its provision of effective legal redress to victimized patients”);
cf. Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 367 (1974) (cautioning about the danger of the
informed consent process turning into “a charade, a symbolic but contentless
formality”).
156. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking:
Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 398, 427 (1990)
(concluding based on observations and interviews that the informed consent
procedures that most doctors use “while sometimes meeting the letter of the
informed consent doctrine, rarely [meet] what should be its spirit, i.e., providing
adequate information and attempting to ensure that patients understand the
information so they can make knowing and voluntary decisions about medical care”
and lamenting that, in practice, “[p]atients are not protected; physicians are
burdened with requirements that mean little; the law and society’s principles
concerning individual autonomy and decisionmaking are effectuated in name
only”); Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 81 (1994) (describing informed consent as “a charade”);
Morris, supra note 154, at 316 (asserting that “[d]eference to doctors has replaced
the duty of disclosure”); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure
Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1705 n.8 (1999) (questioning
whether informed consent truly empowers patients or merely gives “the illusion of
self-determination”).
157. This has been true for a long time. Consider the words of Doctor Oliver
Wendell Holmes: “Your patient has no more right to all the truth you know than he
has to all the medicine in your saddlebags. . . . He should get only just so much as is
good for him.” HOLMES, The Young Practitioner, in DR. HOLMES WRITINGS, supra note
21, at 388. Professor Cathy Jones identifies reasons that medical professionals
commonly give for objecting to the duty of informed consent:
[P]atients neither understand nor remember what they are told, in large
part because the information to be conveyed is too technical for patients to
grasp and is knowable and understandable only by physicians after years of
schooling and training; testing patients’ understanding of what they have
been told is too time consuming and too expensive in terms of the
physician’s additional duties to this patient and others; patients want
physicians to make decisions for them; [and] physicians can convince almost
any patient to do what the physician thinks is best for the patient.
Jones, supra note 156, at 407.
158. Morris, supra note 154, at 370-71 (urging acceptance of proposals made by
various torts scholars “to replace the informed consent doctrine with a new tort that
recognizes and protects the patient’s dignitary interest in informed medical
decisionmaking”); see, e.g., Capron, supra note 155, at 350, 404 (suggesting a new
ground for recovery, building upon negligence and battery theories with its own
rules of conduct, causation, and damages); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed
Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 276 (1985) (urging
adoption of a “new model for the allocation of authority between doctors and
patients” by “direct creation of an independent interest in medical choice” thereby
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incipient development under informed consent relates to attempts to
extend the scope of the duty of disclosure beyond the medical risks
inherent in the medical procedure to encompass risks peculiar to the
physician in question. Although a number of courts have in recent
years extended the scope of the duty to disclose to encompass a duty
159
to disclose alternatives to the contemplated medical procedure and
160
the risks of refusing the suggested procedure, only quite recently
have courts begun to address the question of whether an attending
physician must disclose risks peculiar to him.
Thus far, few cases have addressed the question of the duty to
disclose risks peculiar to the physician (as opposed to risks inherent
in the proposed medical procedure). Most of these cases have
involved situations in which the physician allegedly suffered from
physical or mental impairments that might affect his capacity to
161
provide medical services or from an infectious disease such as
162
HIV. In addition, several cases have expanded the duty to disclose
to encompass potentially conflicting financial or research interests
that may conflict with the patient’s interests and the fiduciary
responsibilities that the physician owes to protect his patient’s health

“[c]reating direct legal protection for patient autonomy”); Weisbard, supra note 155,
at 763 (proposing a “new legal cause of action . . . [imposing] an affirmative
obligation on physicians to facilitate the patient’s exercise of this right to the extent
reasonably possible,” with damages assessed for “dignitary harms”); cf. Alan Meisel, A
“Dignitary Tort” as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the law of Informed
Consent, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 211 (1988) (recommending that the
informed consent doctrine be broadly conceived as protecting the patient’s dignitary
interests); Twerski & Cohen, supra note 155, at 609, 654-64 (suggesting that “courts
should identify and value the decision rights of the plaintiff which the defendant
destroyed by withholding adequate information,” and compensate for their invasion
rather than focusing exclusively on whether the lack of disclosure was deemed to
have caused some physical injury).
159. DOBBS, supra note 78, at 659 n.9; see FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, at 324-25
(summarizing current law as requiring doctors to disclose alternative diagnostic tests
or treatments).
160. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, at 324-26.
161. See, e.g., Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 35
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding the fact that defendant-surgeon suffered from
Raynaud’s Syndrome affecting the use of his hands relevant to patient’s informed
consent claim arising from the results of hip replacement surgery).
162. See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (Md. 1993) (finding that jury
should have been allowed to consider whether failure of surgeon to disclose HIVpositive status constituted a breach of duty); Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at
Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1278-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (holding that
defendant-medical-center properly barred plaintiff from performing surgery and
imposing a requirement of informed consent because his work posed a “reasonable
probability of substantial harm” under informed consent principles even if the
statistical risk of HIV transmission from doctor to patient was small); see also
Iheukwumere, supra note 153, at 396-400 (analyzing three cases addressing a
physician’s duty to disclose his or her HIV infection status to a patient).
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and autonomy interests.
Fewer cases still have involved claims
based on the patient’s lack of information about his physician’s level
of experience and training, the context most relevant to the topic of
residents.
Of cases that have involved this narrow type of claim, a majority
have, for one reason or another, declined to extend the scope of the
164
165
duty to disclose that far. Thus, for example, in Whiteside v. Lukson,
Dr. Lukson, the defendant surgeon performed a laparoscopic
cholecystectomy on the patient. Prior to this, he had participated in
a two-day class on how to perform a cholecystectomy laparoscopically.
163. The most notable example is the decision of the Supreme Court of California
in Moore v. Regents of the University of California. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). In Moore,
plaintiff-patient was suffering from hairy-cell leukemia, treatment for which entailed
removal of his spleen and withdrawal of extensive amounts of blood and aspiration
of bone marrow tissue. 793 P.2d at 481. Plaintiff alleged that his attending physician
failed to disclose that he had formed the intent and made arrangements to conduct
research on plaintiff’s cells to develop and exploit financially. Id. The court held
that the duty to obtain informed consent includes the duty to disclose personal
research or economic interests unrelated to the patient’s health. Id. at 483. Cf. Shea
v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying Minnesota law and
recognizing a claim based on alleged negligent misrepresentation for failure to
disclose financial incentives under HMO contract that related to referrals to
specialists).
164. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 83 (N.J. 2002)
(noting “[c]ourts generally have held that claims of lack of informed consent based
on a failure to disclose professional-background information are without merit,” but
also recognizing a potential informed consent claim when a doctor allegedly
affirmatively misstates his professional experience, and declining to decide whether a
doctor has a duty to disclose); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Haw. 1997)
(relying on a state statute and holding that defendant-physician who was board
certified as an otolaryngologist (ear, nose, throat specialist), facial surgeon, and
cosmetic surgeon and who allegedly disfigured the patient during breast
augmentation surgery, did not have duty to disclose to the patient that he was “not a
plastic surgeon and that he did not have hospital privileges”); Duttry v. Patterson,
771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (holding that “evidence of a physician’s personal
characteristics and experience is irrelevant to an informed consent claim” regardless
of whether the patient inquired about the physician’s experience, but noting by way
of caveat that its holding “should not . . . be read to stand for the proposition that a
physician who misleads his patient is immune” and that a plaintiff may have a cause
of action for misrepresentation where a physician “allegedly provides inaccurate
information regarding his experience”), modified by 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.
§ 1303.504 (d)(2) (West 2002) (stating that a physician may be liable under
informed consent principles if he knowingly misrepresents his “professional
credentials, training or experience”); Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775, 781 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001) (stating that, for the purposes of an informed consent claim by a
patient operated on for papillary carcinoma and alleging that her surgery caused
hypoparathyroidism and vocal cord paralysis, although the defendant may be
required to disclose alternative courses of treatment, “different courses of treatment”
did not include the choice of a more experienced surgeon and a different hospital,
and that, in any event, plaintiff was required to prove decision causation); Whiteside
v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “a surgeon’s lack
of experience in performing a particular surgical procedure is not a material fact for
the purposes of . . . informed consent”).
165. 947 P.2d 1263.
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The class included “hands-on participation in performing the
166
When the defendant sought the
procedure on three pigs.”
plaintiff’s informed consent for the surgery, the defendant had never
performed a cholecystectomy using this laparoscopic technique on a
167
person and he did not inform the plaintiff of this fact.
During
surgery, Dr. Lukson misidentified and consequently damaged the
plaintiff’s bile duct, with resulting complications. Even applying the
“reasonable patient” standard of disclosure, the court held that “a
surgeon’s lack of experience in performing a particular surgical
procedure is not a material fact for the purposes of . . . informed
168
consent.”
A few courts have, however, begun to recognize a duty of disclosure
that at least in some circumstances may include information about
169
the defendant’s level of experience and training. The most notable
166. Id. at 1264.
167. Apparently, by the time he performed surgery on the plaintiff, the defendant
had performed this laparoscopic procedure on two other patients. Id.
168. Id. at 1265.
169. See, e.g., Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Del. 1997) (holding in a
case in which defendant-surgeon allegedly clipped decedent’s carotid artery instead
of the aneurysm during surgery on a cerebral aneurysm, with fatal consequences,
that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony that defendant’s “failure
to inform his patient of his lack of recent aneurysm surgery . . . fell below the
applicable standard of care”); infra text accompanying notes 170-173 (discussing
Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996)); cf. Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d
157, 169-70 (Md. 2000) (holding in a case in which fourth year resident allegedly
dissected plaintiff’s bile duct instead of the cystic duct during gall bladder surgery,
that, as a matter of his contractual undertaking, the attending surgeon could be
subject to potential liability for allegedly breaching his contractual understanding
with the patient regarding the allocation of tasks between the attending surgeon and
the resident, but finding that the trial court’s failure to submit the question to the
jury was harmless error based on jury’s findings of fact); Howard, 800 A.2d at 83
(recognizing a potential informed consent claim when a doctor allegedly
affirmatively
misstates
his
professional
experience
by
“significant
misrepresentations,” but declining to decide whether a doctor has a duty to disclose).
The Dingle court noted that given the “expanding era of more complex medical
procedures, group practices, and collaborative efforts among health care
providers . . . the identity of the persons who will be performing aspects of the
surgery” and “who, precisely, will be conducting or superintending the procedure or
therapy” must be discussed and resolved, at least if raised by the patient. 749 A.2d at
166.
In Howard, the plaintiff underwent unsuccessful back surgery leaving plaintiff in a
quadriplegic state.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant-surgeon had
misrepresented his experience and credentials by stating that he was board certified
at a time when he was merely board-eligible, and only became board certified more
than two years after the plaintiff’s surgery. Howard, 800 A.2d at 76 n.1. Plaintiff also
alleged that the defendant had told him and his wife that he had performed about
sixty corpectomies in each of the eleven years that he had been performing such
procedures, whereas the defendant had performed approximately “‘a couple
dozen’” during his career. Id. at 76-77. The court held that a “significant” or
“serious” misrepresentation concerning “the quality or extent of a physician’s
professional experience . . . can be material to the grant of intelligent and informed
consent.” Id. at 83. The court thus expressly extended the scope of informed
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decision recognizing a potential to disclose this type of physician170
experience information is Johnson v. Kokemoor, a decision by the
highly respected Justice Shirley Abrahamson. In Johnson, the plaintiffpatient was stricken with partial (“incomplete”) quadriplegia
resulting from neurosurgery to clip a large cerebral posterior basilar
bifurcation aneurysm. The plaintiff alleged that she was not provided
with sufficient information about the level of experience of the
defendant-surgeon in connection with the especially challenging
nature of surgery for the specific type of cerebral aneurysm involved.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held, for the purposes of
informed consent, that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in admitting evidence regarding the defendant’s lack of
experience, the difficulty of the proposed surgery, the fact that
different physicians have “substantially different success rates” with
171
the same medical procedure, the comparable risks of surgery
performed by the defendant versus surgery performed at a tertiary
care facility (in this case, the Mayo Clinic), and evidence that the
defendant should have advised the plaintiff of the option of
undergoing surgery at a tertiary care facility. The court reasoned that
this type of information fell within the general obligation of
physicians to disclose “viable alternatives” to the proposed
172
treatment.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Johnson strove assiduously to
contain the potential reach of it’s holding, saying that “‘[i]t is a rare
exception when the vast body of medical literature and expert
opinion agree that the difference in experience of the surgeon
performing the operation will impact the risk of morbidity/mortaility
173
as was the case here.’” The reality remains, however, that there may
be significant differences in outcomes between residents and more
consent doctrine to cover the alleged misstatements, and noted that “[s]tripped to its
essentials, plaintiff’s claim is founded on lack of informed consent.” Id. at 84. But,
the court declined to decide whether, under its prudent patient standard, “personal
credentials and experience” may be a required part of an informed consent
disclosure, noting that “[o]ur case law never has held that a doctor has a duty to
detail his background and experience as part of the required informed consent
disclosure; nor are we called on to decide that question here.” Id. at 82.
170. 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
171. The court’s holding here applied at least when “defendant elected to explain
the risks confronting the plaintiff in statistical terms.” Id. at 508.
172. Id. at 498, 501 n.17 (relying on both case law and statute).
173. Id. at 510 (quoting from Brief for Petitioner at 40); see also Prissel v.
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., No. 02-1729, 2003 WL 22998133, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003) (requiring (and not finding in the record) proof that the morbidity and
mortality rate expected of the defendant-physician when assisted by a physician’s
assistant was higher than the rate expected of another cardiovascular surgeon when
assisted by another surgeon).
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experienced and established specialists. But, that said, it does not
follow that taking an informed consent route to address that reality is
a sensible course. In fact, it would raise a host of complexities.
In addition to the mixed reaction of the courts to extending the
scope of the duty to disclose a physician’s level of experience, there
would be complications that are inherent in the informed consent
doctrine. Would the Johnson holding mean that virtually any surgeon
within ninety miles of the Mayo Clinic must essentially apprise his
patients of the option of going to the Mayo Clinic? In other words,
where is the stopping point once we start down that informed
consent road? Moreover, the fact that residencies are a learning
continuum that defy statistical generalization, or perhaps any
meaningful relative generalizations at all, would limit the range of
experience-based risk information that one could confidently impart.
What do the “success rates” really tell us? Might these rates be skewed
by how one defines “morbidity”? And, from what period of time is a
physician’s performance average to be derived?
And, even more complexity resides here in the physician-specific
information claims when causation is considered. At least two core
174
causation dimensions are implicated in informed consent cases.
175
First, in what has been termed “decision causation,” the failure to
disclose must have been outcome-determinative to the decision of a
reasonable person (under the prevailing rule) to undergo the
procedure. This means essentially that, had the required information
been disclosed, a reasonable patient in the plaintiff’s position would
176
have chosen a different course of action.
This causation
174. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 121-22 (1976) (outlining the practical obstacles to showing (1) that
the plaintiff would reasonably have rejected the proposed treatment if informed and
(2) that the injury would not have occurred if the patient had reasonably made an
informed choice for an alternative treatment); Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick,
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L.
REV. 407, 438-39 (1980) (comparing the “rarely acknowledged” issue of injury
causation with the more widely examined issue of decision causation); Aaron D.
Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing
Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999) (defining “decision causation”
and “injury causation” and noting that decision causation requires the patient to
prove he would have reasonably declined his doctor’s advice if fully informed even
though most “reasonable patients generally follow the nonnegligent
recommendations of their reasonable doctors”).
175. Meisel & Kabnick, supra note 174; see also Twerski & Cohen, supra note 155, at
617 & n.38, 643; Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 9.
176. This proof would most likely be governed by a reasonable person test. See
DOBBS, supra note 78, at 657 (explaining that the reasonable patient standard is
“unique to medical informed consent cases” and limits the doctor’s duty of
disclosure, but has been widely accepted). Thus, here, plaintiff would have to also
prove that a reasonable person in his position, if receiving adequate disclosure,
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component is much easier to satisfy when the omitted information
177
relates to risk information tied to the specific treating physician.
The problem lies with the second companion causation dimension
178
that has been referred to as “injury causation.”
This causation
component requires proof not only that the harm suffered by the
patient was caused by the treatment or therapeutic approach in
question, but it also contemplates an additional requirement, which
“concerns whether the patient’s decision to undergo the procedure
caused any harm in comparison to the choice that otherwise would
179
have been made.”
For present purposes, the plaintiff would
presumably also have to show that the harm complained of would not
have materialized had he been adequately informed about the
relative experience level of his physician because the performance of
another health care provider whom he would have reasonably chosen
180
would have avoided the harmful consequences.
would have decided differently.
177. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 12. The authors note:
In these cases, the question is not whether the patient would have consented
to the procedure in question (as opposed to some other procedure with a
different risk matrix, or as opposed to the risk of undergoing no procedure
at all). Rather, the question is whether the patient would have consented to
the procedure to be performed by this provider with this provider’s level of
risk, as opposed to being performed by another provider with that provider’s
lower level of risk. Disputes concerning the identity of the provider do not,
by their nature, necessarily inhabit the same narrow bounds as cases
concerning the procedure itself. Rather, decision causation in this context
can, and often will, be in the realm of “easy” cases.
Id.
178. Meisel & Kabnick, supra note 174, at 438; see also Twerski & Cohen, supra note
155, at 617 & n.38; Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 9.
179. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 9; see Meyers v. Epstein, 282 F. Supp. 2d
151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New York law and analyzing claim alleging that
surgeon who performed surgery was not the one to whom consent had been given
under informed consent principles, and holding that damages for the harm from
complications of the surgery were not recoverable unless plaintiffs “can show that the
results of the surgery would have been different had it been performed by [a surgeon
to whom consent was given]”); see also Epstein, supra note 174, at 121. Epstein
elaborates:
The second causal question raised in informed consent cases concerns what
might have happened to the patient if appropriate disclosures had led him
to refuse the proposed treatment. While it might be tempting to hold the
physician responsible for the harm caused by the treatment, that position is
quite unsound if it does not take into account the harm that would have
occurred in any event.
Id. at 121-22.
180. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 85 (N.J. 2002)
(discussing the injury causation dimension of the causation requirement in informed
consent case arising out of alleged misinformation regarding the surgeon’s
credentials and experience); Prissel v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., No. 02-1729, 2003
WL 22998133, at *10-11 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the requirement of causation
in a case based on an alleged failure to disclose physician-specific risk and requiring
not only decision causation, but also that the plaintiff prove that the morbidity and
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Presumably, then, the plaintiff having undergone a specific
medical procedure must not only prove that had he been adequately
informed about the relative inexperience of the defendant-physician,
181
he reasonably would have opted to have the procedure performed
by a different health care provider (perhaps at a different medical
facility), the plaintiff must also establish that the harm he is
complaining of was caused by the treatment he actually received and
that this harm is greater than what he would have suffered had he
been warned and had he chosen a different health care provider or
treatment path. The problem here is that the patient might well have
suffered the same outcome even at the hands of a more experienced
healthcare provider.
As a response to this causation perturbation, Twerski and Cohen
suggest that the “lost chance doctrines provide a doctrinal umbrella
182
for assessing liability.”
In Johnson, for example, the comparison
could be made in various ways. Perhaps the most likely basis would
compare the usual morbidity and mortality rate of fifteen percent to
the estimate for one with the “defendant’s relatively limited
experience” of close to thirty percent. Then, under a loss of chance
analysis we might calculate: thirty minus fifteen equals a loss of a
fifteen percent chance of avoiding the adverse result.
mortality rate expected for the defendant when assisted by a physician’s assistant was
higher than the rate expected of another cardiovascular surgeon when assisted by
another surgeon, and also that the patient’s injury was a materialization of that
increased risk). The court in Howard said:
[T]o satisfy the damages element in a claim based on a lack of informed
consent, a plaintiff typically has to show a causal connection between the
inadequately disclosed risk of the procedure and the injury sustained. If that
risk materialized and harmed plaintiff, damages for those injuries are
awarded. Here, if successful in his claim based on lack of informed consent,
plaintiff may receive damages for injuries caused by an inadequately
disclosed risk of the corpectomy procedure.
800 A.2d at 85 (citations omitted). Unfortunately, the court’s language was very
general and did not detail precisely what the plaintiff must prove to satisfy this
element. As such, it failed to address the complex nuances of injury causation in this
setting. See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
181. This proof would most likely be governed by a reasonable person test. See
DOBBS, supra note 78, at 657 (explaining that the reasonable patient standard is
“unique to medical informed consent cases” and limits the doctor’s duty of
disclosure, but has been widely accepted). Thus, here, plaintiff would also have to
prove that a reasonable person in his position, if receiving adequate disclosure,
would have decided to have the procedure performed by a different health care
provider (perhaps at a different medical facility).
182. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 23. This also seems to have been what
Marjorie Schultz had in mind generally when elaborating on her proposal for a new
model directly creating a new independent interest in medical choice. Shultz, supra
note 158, at 287 (contending that “the loss of an uncertain chance of a preferable
outcome . . . can be valued as a matter of assessing damage”) (citing Joseph H. King,
Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions
and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. J. 1353 (1981)).
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Although I am a champion of the principle of the loss of a chance
183
doctrine in other contexts, that doctrine may not be suitable here
in the informed consent setting. First, the statistical comparisons may
be flawed because the circumstances of individual patients on which
they are based may not be commensurable. The statistical sample
from the experienced-physician cohort may be too small to be
meaningful or the relevant information may be unavailable. Also,
since residencies are a learning continuum, individual statistical
generalization may not be feasible. Moreover, the statistics for the
defendant-resident would be speculative, unscientific, and in any
event, based upon too small a sample (almost by definition since our
defendant is inexperienced) to be meaningful. Second, there would
also be problems with defining “success rates” and “morbidity,” as
well as selecting the period of time from which a physician’s
performance average would be derived. The definition of success or
failure may be different for the defendant and the other provider to
which he is compared. The definitions for adverse outcomes may be
too broad, dissimilar, or general to make any comparison
meaningful.
The AMA’s own professional opinions have not contributed clear
direction in this matter. At one time they provided that “[i]f a
resident or other physician is to perform the operation under the
guidance of the surgeon, it is necessary to make a full disclosure of
this fact to the patient, and this should be evidenced by an
184
appropriate statement contained in the consent.” Those guidelines
then added that if the surgeon employed “merely assists the
resident . . . in performing the operation, it is the resident . . . who
becomes the operating surgeon . . . [and that] [i]f the patient is not
informed as to the identity of the operating surgeon, the situation is
185
‘ghost surgery.’”
However, the current opinion states: “If a resident or other
physician is to perform the operation under non-participatory
supervision, it is necessary to make a full disclosure of this fact to the
183. For an article associated with the development and judicial acceptance of the
“loss of a chance” theory in medical malpractice law, see King, supra. For additional
elaboration on the conceptual nuances of the loss of a chance doctrine, see Joseph H.
King, “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance
Doctrine, 28 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 491, 546-54 (1998). See generally Lars Noah, An
Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG.
369 (2005) (discussing some of the pitfalls and potential errors in application of the
doctrine).
184. American Medical Association Judicial Council Opinion 8.12 (1982), quoted
in Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 168 n.3 (Md. 2000).
185. American Medical Association Judicial Council Opinion 8.12.
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patient, and this should be evidenced by an appropriate statement
contained in the consent. Under these circumstances, it is the
186
resident or other physician who becomes the operating surgeon.”
Thus, the change represents deliberate silence by the Judicial
Council of the AMA on the potential duties of disclosure when a
resident undertakes to perform medical procedures in the presence
of the attending physician (since then it would presumably be
participatory
supervision
rather
than
“non-participatory
supervision”).
Some commentators have raised the possibility of vindicating the
patient’s interest in information regarding the physician’s education
and experience by invoking other theories of liability, such as some
187
aspect of a misrepresentation theory. The misrepresentation route
raises a host of complications and is problematic. In the first place,
the “misrepresentation” or “fraud” moniker may mean different
things depending on the eye of the beholder. It might, for instance,
be invoked not as a discrete theory of liability, but rather as a means
of attempting to invalidate a patient’s consent in order to support a
188
claim by the patient for battery.
Or, misrepresentation might be
189
Adding to the
asserted as a freestanding theory of liability.
confusion, some commentators seem to meld the two ideas, battery
186. Substitution of Surgeon without Patient’s Knowledge or Consent, AM. MED.
ASS’N, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-8.16 (1994), http://www.amaassn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.html (follow “Accept” hyperlink; then
follow “Code of Medical Ethics” hyperlink; then follow “E-8.00 Opinions on Practice
Matters” hyperlink; then follow “E-8.16 Substitution of Surgeon without Patient’s
Knowledge or Consent” hyperlink).
187. See Heyward H. Bouknight, III, Note, Between the Scalpel and the Lie: Comparing
Theories of Physician Accountability for Misrepresentations of Experience and Competence, 60
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1560 (2003) (recommending a misrepresentation-based
“fraud” cause of action premised upon a “legally enforceable expectation” that a
physician will reply honestly to a patient “who specifically inquires about his doctor’s
experience”). One court has noted the multifarious legal theories that might be
invoked, at least when an attending physician allegedly fails to abide by an
understanding regarding the allocation of responsibilities between attending
physicians and residents. See Dingle, 749 A.2d at 170. The Dingle court stated:
The lack of a clear understanding prior to the procedure may well engender
a later finding that informed consent was not obtained. A violation of an
understanding so reached may constitute the lack of informed consent,
negligent delegation, and a breach of the contract, not to mention the risk
of a claim of misrepresentation or fraud. It would be prudent, of course, for
the written consent form presented to the patient either to set forth any
special understanding in this regard or note affirmatively that there is no
such understanding.
Id.
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1979) (clarifying that
consent induced by a substantial mistake resulting from misrepresentation is not
effective consent for the unanticipated invasion or harm).
189. See Bouknight, supra note 187, at 1545.
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190

and misrepresentation. The misrepresentation characterization, as
either a prong of a battery claim or a freestanding misrepresentation
cause of action, seems a singularly blunt instrument with which to
address the matter of nondisclosures by medical residents.
A battery characterization or allegation may raise a number of
complications. That route would present the question of whether
such claims should nonetheless be governed exclusively by the
informed consent doctrine irrespective of attempts to characterize it
191
as a battery.
That in turn could depend on whether a resident
merely failed to disclose or misstated his experience and background,
or more seriously, failed to reveal or misstated his involvement in the
192
patient’s surgery or other treatment.
The Restatement provides
that consent may be invalidated by a mistake “concerning the nature
193
of the invasion . . . or the extent of the harm to be expected” if that
mistake is known to the defendant or is induced by the defendant’s
misrepresentation. A key question would presumably be whether the
defendant either knew of the patient’s “mistake,” or induced it.
190. See id. (referring in the same paragraph to fraudulent misrepresentation as a
“stand-alone tort” and allowing the plaintiff “to bring an action for battery”).
191. Cf. supra note 179 (discussing Meyers v. Epstein, 282 F. Supp. 2d 151, 156
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). But, the same judge in an earlier opinion in the same case said
that “informed consent cases are inapposite.” Meyers v. Epstein, 232 F. Supp. 2d 192,
196 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
192. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 81 (N.J. 2002);
Bundrick v. Stewart, 114 P.3d 1204, 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); see also infra note
195 (discussing the Meyers opinions). In Howard, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
rejected a battery characterization where the defendant-surgeon had allegedly
misstated the level of his specialty board certification and the number of times he
had performed corpectomies. In doing so, the court distinguished this situation
from a true “ghost surgery” situation in which a different physician performs the
surgery than the one to whom the patient specifically consented and contemplated
would perform it. 800 A.2d at 81. The court specifically noted that a battery claim
might lie “where there has been ‘ghost surgery’ or where no consent has been given
for the procedure undertaken.” Id.
In Bundrick, the patient suffered a massive infection resulting from improper
suture placement during an attempt to repair the mesentery lining of her bowel
during tubal reanastomosis surgery. She alleged, inter alia, that a medical battery
had occurred based on the allegation that a third-year resident participated in the
surgery without her consent. The court implied that the resident might have owed a
duty to the patient to disclose the fact that he would be participating in the plaintiff’s
surgery, saying that the resident “had no right to participate without [the patient’s]
consent.” 114 P.2d at 1209. The court, however, went on to affirm the judgment
against the plaintiff on the medical battery claim, relying on the “broad” consent
signed by the patient consenting to “all medical treatment or . . . services performed or
prescribed by/or at the direction of the attending physician,” as sufficient. Id. (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). The jury had been instructed that “[a] patient may
refuse to consent to a particular doctor . . . [and a] health care provider has a duty to
honor such a refusal of consent if the patient has informed the health care provider
of the refusal.” Id. (citation ommitted). The jury then found that the patient did not
refuse consent to the participation of the resident. Id.
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1979).
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Furthermore, the courts would have to decide whether mere silence
constituted misrepresentation, which in turn might ultimately entail
deciding the fundamental question of whether or when a resident
owed a duty to disclose such information to the patient. The
apparent perceived overlap between misrepresentation, or at least
negligent misrepresentation, and informed consent further clouds
194
the analysis.
Likewise, invoking a freestanding misrepresentation theory would
195
Should a distinction be
involve its own parade of entanglements.
drawn based on whether a defendant-resident affirmatively misstated
196
his experience or merely failed to disclose it? And, if the physician
merely failed to disclose information about his credentials, training,
or experience, the outcome would depend in part on whether the
197
court imposed a duty to disclose under the circumstances.
198
Moreover, proof of reliance would most certainly be required.
194. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 504 n.29 (Wis. 1996) (noting that
an overlap exists between negligent misrepresentation and informed consent, and
that “allegations made and evidence introduced by the plaintiff might have fit
comfortably under either theory”).
195. See, e.g., Meyers, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 196-201 (discussing the complex torts,
damages, causation, and proximate causation aspects of malpractice and fraud claims
against a surgeon to whom consent had been given, and a battery claim against
another surgeon who allegedly performed the surgery); Meyers, 282 F. Supp. 2d at
155 (analyzing a claim alleging that surgeon who performed surgery was not the one
to whom consent had been given under informed consent principles and holding
that damages for harm from the complications of the surgery were not recoverable
unless plaintiffs “can show that the results of the surgery would have been different
had it been performed by [surgeon to whom consent was given]”). The court had
initially allowed the malpractice claim against the surgeon and the battery claim
against the resident surgeon who allegedly performed the surgery to proceed. See
Meyers, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 199-201.
196. The complex issue of whether or when there is a duty to disclose in the
context of fraudulent misrepresentation claims for pecuniary losses unrelated to
personal injury is addressed in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551 (1977). The sheer uncertainty of it all is especially evident in section
551(e) (assigning a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose facts to the other
party before the transaction is consummated, including “facts basic to the
transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to
them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of
the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of
those facts”).
197. See Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 959 (Haw. 1997) (holding that an
instruction to the jury on fraud was erroneous because that defendant-physician who
was board certified as otolaryngologist, facial surgeon, and cosmetic surgeon and
who allegedly disfigured the plaintiff in breast augmentation surgery, did not have
duty to disclose to the patient that he was “not a plastic surgeon and that he did not
have hospital privileges”).
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965) (dealing with liability for
conscious misrepresentation involving a risk of physical harm); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) (dealing with liability for negligent
misrepresentation involving a risk of physical harm); § 546 (dealing with the
causation requirements for fraudulent misrepresentation resulting in exclusively
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Little wonder, then, that a majority of the few cases to consider the
question have resisted using the misrepresentation theory to remedy
the problem of inadequate patient information regarding a
199
physician’s education, training, and experience.
Occasionally, a case will even invoke breach of contract as a
possible theory of liability. For example, in one case, a fourth-year
resident dissected a patient’s bile duct instead of the cystic duct
200
during a gall bladder surgery.
The court held that an attending
surgeon could potentially be liable for allegedly breaching his
contractual understanding with the patient regarding the allocation
of tasks during surgery between the attending surgeon and the
201
resident.
pecuniary loss unrelated to personal injury); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1977) (dealing with reliance requirement for negligent misrepresentation resulting
in exclusively pecuniary loss unrelated to personal injury). For discussion of the four
dimensions of reliance generally, see Joseph H. King, Limiting the Vicarious Liability of
Franchisors for the Torts of their Franchisees, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 444-45, 448-60
(2005) (discussing the reliance requirement for apparent agency for the purposes of
vicarious liability).
199. Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 82 (N.J. 2002)
(citing cases that have rejected a claim of fraud cause of action where physicians
allegedly misrepresent or fail to disclose background credentials). The Howard court
followed the reasoning of these cases and held that even allegations that the
defendant surgeon affirmatively misrepresented his credentials and experience
could not be pursued as a fraud or deceit-based claim. Id. In rejecting such a fraud
claim under the circumstances, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that not
only might such an approach increase the possibility of an award of punitive
damages, but the court also suggested its discomfort with fraud claims arising solely
from the physician-patient relationship. Id. The court did, however, expressly
extend the scope of the informed consent doctrine to cover these misstatements and
noted that the plaintiff’s claim was essentially founded on lack of informed consent.
Id. at 84; see also Ditto, 947 P.2d at 959 (holding that since defendant-physician who
allegedly disfigured the plaintiff during breast augmentation surgery did not have a
duty to disclose to the patient that he was not a certified plastic surgeon and did not
have hospital privileges, instructing the jury on fraud was erroneous); Paulos v.
Johnson, 597 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that where a plaintiff
claimed that he was erroneously advised that the defendant-physician was a boardcertified plastic surgeon, that a fraudulent misrepresentation claim could not lie).
Notably, at least one case has held that wheras an informed consent cause of
action is not available, a claim for misrepresentation might be available if a physician
provides inaccurate information about his experience and training prior to
performing a medical procedure. See Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa.
2001) (holding that “evidence of a physician’s personal characteristics and
experience is irrelevant to an informed consent claim” but stressing that the court’s
holding “should not . . . be read to stand for the proposition that a physician who
misleads a patient is immune from suit,” because a plaintiff may have a cause of
action for misrepresentation where a physician “allededly provides inaccurate
information regarding his experience”), modified by 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.
§ 1303.504(d)(2) (West 2002) (stating that a physician may be liable under informed
consent principles for knowingly misrepresenting his professional credentials,
training or experience).
200. See Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 159 (Md. 2000).
201. Id. at 169-70 (finding, however, that a breach of contract claim could not
survive because an issue that was central to the plaintiff’s contract claim was
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Even if a new theory of liability were created to sidestep the
202
causation-of-physical-harm hurdles or to augment the traditional
203
such an approach would be
informed consent doctrine,
problematic. The courts would still have to grapple with the problem
of how to value any new interest independent of the physical
dimension of the treatment. This is the soft spot in proposals to
create a new dignitary theory of liability to supplement the traditional
informed consent remedy.
For example, Shultz, Twerski, and Cohen, who were early
proponents for recognizing a brand-new autonomy interest in
204
information necessary for informed medical decisionmaking, seem
vague on precisely how damages for invasions of the proposed
dignitary interest would be valued. Shultz writes:
Identification of an intangible interest in choice could also allow
recovery for less traditional categories of harm. Courts could
evaluate consequences of a substantial but not necessarily
“physical” or “injurious” (as socially judged) harm . . . . For
example, although emotional distress damages would constitute a
particularly likely result of invasions of this interest, courts could
205
restrict such recoveries.

We are not told, however, precisely how the courts are to limit
recoveries. Similarly, Twerski and Cohen state:
Not all choice deprivations are of equal magnitude. When valuing
the denial to the plaintiff of his right to exercise options, one must
consider the range of options available and their possible benefits
and detriments. The greater the range of benefits available
through alternate choice, the greater the harm done to the choicemaking process . . . . Once more, the focus on the undesirable
result rather than on the uninformed nature of the decisionmaking process has diverted attention from the actual damages
206
that flow from a crippled decision-making process.

submitted to the jury at trial, where the jury found in the defendant’s favor).
202. See supra notes 174-183 and accompanying text (addressing the challenge that
results for plaintiffs in meeting the dual-causation standard, particularly the “injury
causation” prong).
203. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (exploring the theory proposed by
various scholars that the informed consent doctrine either be broadly conceived to
protect the patient’s dignitary interests or be replaced by a tort that would protect
the patient’s right to autonomous decisionmaking).
204. See supra note 158.
205. Shultz, supra note 158, at 290 (citations omitted).
206. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 155, at 658-59; see Weisbard, supra note 155, at
763 (suggesting that damages for dignitary harms should be based on a statutory
schedule ranging from $1,000 to $10,000, perhaps allowing for greater recovery for
punitive damages in unusual circumstances).
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We are left with sparse guidance as to how such dignitary interests are
to be measured. Then, we would face the ethereal labor of
attempting to convert the non-economic effects of a perceived
invasion of a patient’s autonomy or dignitary interests into money
207
(read damages), despite the fact that the two are incommensurable.
I prefer not to attempt to force the problem of resident-based
medical errors into an informed consent/loss-of-chance vessel or into
a newly minted but undefined freestanding autonomy cause of
action. A more sensible approach would be to meld a duty to disclose
one’s resident status with the standard of care rule used to evaluate
the defendant’s overall performance of the medical procedure. That
approach is discussed in the following section.
III. THESIS AND PROPOSAL
A. Proposed Standard of Care Rule
Rather than address the problem of treatment by medical residents
exclusively through either the standard of care or the doctrine of
informed consent (or some other information-based theory of
liability), I propose the following more elegant solution that melds
the two doctrines: When medical residents (both not-yet-licensed
and licensed ones) fully disclose their status, including their
experience, training, education, and credentials, to their patients,
then their performance should be judged by a standard of care
commensurate with their actual level of post-graduate medical
training, education, and experience. Licensed residents should, in
addition and as a minimum, be held to the standard of a licensed
general practitioner. A resident (either licensed or not-yet-fullylicensed) who either affirmatively misstates or fails to disclose his
status will not be permitted to avail himself of the standard
commensurate with his limited experience and training. If such
resident affirmatively misrepresents his credentials and experience,
then he should at least be held to the standard commensurate with
the professional background that he claims to possess.
Now for the tough part. When a resident fails to disclose, I
propose the following approach: When a resident fails to disclose his
status, not-yet-fully-licensed residents should be held to the standard
207. I have addressed this problem more broadly in another publication. See
Joseph H. King, Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57
SMU L. REV. 163 (2004) (suggesting that damages for pain and suffering should not
be recoverable in personal injury tort claims, with the trade-off that the scope of
economic damages and attorney’s fees be broadly conceived).
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of care expected of a fully licensed physician who has completed his
internship. A non-disclosing licensed resident, actively participating
in a graduate medical program to prepare him for a medical
specialty, should be held to the standard of the specialty covered by
his residency program when serving n the capacity of a specialist,
unless he can prove that the patient’s reasonable expectations were
of some less demanding standard, in which case he will be held to a
standard commensurate with those expectations. As a practical
matter, then, a non-disclosing licensed resident would usually be held
to the specialty of his residency program when he is serving in the
role of a specialist or in the scope of that specialty. For example, a
non-disclosing surgical resident would be held to the standard of care
of a specialist-surgeon when performing surgery or managing a postoperative patient’s care. On the other hand, that same resident may
not be held to the specialist-surgeon standard when helping to
conduct physical exams that the hospital offered to the local high
schools as a public service.
Thus far, I have been addressing the conduct of medical residents
while actively engaged within the scope of their duties in their
graduate medical-education residency programs.
Residents
208
sometimes moonlight at hospital emergency rooms and elsewhere,
and may be functioning outside of the scope of their formal
residency-training program. I would also apply my suggested rule in
this scenario as well. Therefore, in the absence of disclosure to the
patient of their residency status, it would have to be decided whether
such moonlighting residents were serving in a generalist or in a
specialist capacity (unless the resident could show that the patient’s
209
reasonable expectations were of some less demanding standard).
Under the preceding proposal, alleged malpractice against a
medical resident would proceed as a traditional claim for negligent
performance of professional medical services. That being so, the
burden of proof would be on the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant-resident violated the standard of care—as defined in
accordance with the proposed rule—and if so, to prove the harm
caused by that alleged substandard care.
208. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of
moonlighting among residents and the substantial criticism that accompanies this
practice).
209. See generally Keim & Chisholm, supra note 22, at 927 (declaring that “[w]e
believe patients who are cared for by a moonlighting physician have the right to
expect that their physician practices according to the standard of care for EM
[Emergency Medicine],” adding that “[m]oonlighting weakens the fabric of our
profession, and continues to propagate the myth that ‘anyone can work in an ER’”).
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The confusing state of the law regarding the standard of care for
residents has inspired a number of suggestions by others for reform.
These typically address the matter exclusively through the standard of
210
211
care, through manipulation of the doctrine of informed consent,
or by the use of some other theory of liability, such as
212
In general, I do not believe such proposals
misrepresentation.
strike a suitable balance between competing interests, nor are they
213
sufficiently predictable in their operation.
B. Rationale
In addressing the standard of care for residents, we must confront
the contending interests and the difficult underlying ethical dilemma
210. See, e.g., Reuter, supra note 40, at 492 (stating that residents “should be held
to a progressively higher standard as their knowledge, experience, and practice
progressively increase through their residency training”). Reuter goes on to say that
“[f]irst-year residents should be held to the standard of practice of a generalist[,] . . .
final-year residents should be held to the standard of a specialist[,] . . . and [h]ouse
staff in the middle of their training period should be held to an intermediate
standard.” Id. I believe, however, that residents should not be permitted to avail
themselves of the sliding scale standard of care unless they have fully disclosed their
status and level of education and experience to their patients. See also Ward, supra
note 28, at 295-96 (suggesting a two-step approach to determine the appropriate
standard of case for residents). If a resident held himself out as a specialist, Ward
advocates that the court hold the resident to the same standard of care as a specialist
in the field in which the resident was practicing. Id. at 296. But, if the court
determined that the resident did not hold himself out as a specialist, it should “move
to step two to determine if the procedure in question is ordinarily performed only by
specialists.” Id. Further, “[i]f the procedure in question is usually undertaken only
by specialists, then the court would hold the resident to the same standard as a
specialist.” Id.
The Ward proposal suffers from several shortcomings. First, it depends initially on
a determination of whether a resident held himself out as a specialist. But what if a
resident says nothing? When will a resident be deemed to have held himself out? I
prefer a rule that places an incentive on the resident to disclose affirmatively his
status and background, which ideally would foster a dialogue with the patient if the
resident’s background is important to the patient. Moreover, under Ward’s
proposal, residents who hold themselves out as specialists would automatically be
held to that standard. I prefer affording residents who fully disclose their status the
benefit of a sliding scale standard expected of a person with a similar level of postgraduate professional education, training, and experience.
Under Ward’s proposal, if a defendant did not hold himself out as a specialist, then
he would be held to the standards of a general practitioner unless he performed a
procedure that is usually undertaken only by specialists. But whether a procedure is
usually undertaken only by specialists would be difficult to determine. Also, what is
meant by “specialist”—only those who are board certified? Board eligible? There
might also be a question of which specialty the resident should be considered under
because sometimes multiple specialties undertake the same medical procedure. This
approach leaves many questions and ambiguities.
211. Supra notes 158, 182 and accompanying text.
212. Supra note 187 and accompanying text.
213. For a more detailed assessment, see supra note 210 (addressing standard of
care proposals); supra notes 173-183 (discussing an informed consent approach);
supra notes 187-197 (analyzing a variety of misrepresentation proposals).
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that they create. On the one hand, we have the individual patients
whose safety, health, and rights to self-determination are at stake.
Medicine, like any professional activity, improves with experience. In
fact, Professors Twerski and Cohen tell us that for all medical
procedures studied, the data consistently show an inverse relationship
between the number of procedures performed per provider and the
rates of unfavorable outcomes, as measured by risk-adjusted mortality
or complication rates and thus suggest that “‘practice makes
214
proficiency.’”
Accordingly, “[a]ny contention that a reasonable
patient would consider his or her physician’s level of experience
immaterial to a procedure, particularly an invasive procedure, is
215
clearly contradicted by real life experiences.” But the health of us
all depends on the education, training, and experience of residents
so that they may assume their crucial roles among the most qualified
216
medical specialists in the world.
And it is essential that the
217
individual resident gains needed experience. Thus, the immediate
microcosmic interests of individual patients may be arrayed against

214. Twerski and Cohen, supra note 174, at 13 n.30 (quoting Don Colburn,
Practice Makes Proficiency in Bypass Surgery, Study Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1997, at
WH-5).
215. Iheukwumere, supra note 153, at 413-14; see Gregory L. Larkin et al., Great
Expectations: Patient/Customer Preferences for Resident Physicians (RPs) & Physician
Extenders (PEs) in the Emergency Department (ED), 6 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 384a
[Abstract], (1999) (reporting that 65.3% of emergency room patients want to know
the level of training of the health-care providers that are caring for them).
At least one state has addressed the patient’s disclosure interests by statute. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2961(E) (2003). This statute requires that the Board of Medicine
adopt guidelines providing for:
[T]he obtaining of informed consent from all patients or from the next of
kin or legally authorized representative, to the extent practical under the
circumstances . . . after such patients or other persons have been informed as
to which physicians, residents, or interns will perform the surgery or other
invasive procedure.
Id. The statute mentions that the guidelines should also include:
[P]olicies to avoid situations, unless the circumstances fall within an
exception in the Board’s guidelines or the policies of the relevant hospital,
medical school or other organization operating the graduate medical
education program, in which a surgeon, intern or resident represents that he
will perform a surgery or other invasive procedure that he then fails to
perform.
Id.
216. The courts have acknowledged the importance of this interest. See, e.g.,
Owens v. Thomae, 904 So. 2d 207, 210 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that established
physicians engaged in the training of residents are fulfilling the state’s strong interest
in educating medical students, interns, and residents that will be society’s future
doctors).
217. See Rush v. Akron Gen. Hosp., 171 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957)
(commenting that the intern’s primary reward is the practical medical and surgical
instruction that he gains from assisting or watching the more experienced physicians
treat a spectrum of patient and illnesses).
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the longer term macrocosmic ones; namely the education of the
218
medical profession.
In the individual patient we hear the echo of that Kantian
admonition—we must not treat any person as a means, but rather
219
always as ends. Thus, Kant’s classic construct states: “Act in such a
way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the
220
same time as an end.” He refers to the autonomy of the will “as the
221
supreme principle of morality.” But, as Professor Daniel Markovits
reminds us, Kant’s “categorical imperative” contains two distinct
222
commands concerning how to treat humanity. Markovits explains:
The principle that one should never use persons merely as
means prohibits actions that follow principles or rules . . . that
could not possibly be accepted by the persons whom the actions
affect. The principle that one should always treat other persons as
ends in themselves prohibits actions in pursuit of ends that the
persons whom they affect cannot share . . . . The first command—
about not using persons merely as means—captures the idea that
persons are not simply available to one another. Unlike things,
persons have independent intellects and wills . . . concerning the
world and their places in it. A person who acts against others based
on a maxim that they cannot accept in effect denies this: She
bypasses their . . . intellects and their wills . . . and so treats them
not as persons but merely as things.
The second command—about treating persons as ends in
themselves—captures the idea that even though persons are not
simply available to one another, they must nevertheless be open to
one another . . . . A person who acts against others in pursuit of
ends that they cannot share, even if she responds to their wills in
one way, does so on terms that necessarily set her apart from them
218. There may also be are other conflicts here. See, e.g., Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d
157, 169-70 (Md. 2000). The court asserted:
The parties may well have conflicting interests in that regard—the doctor
wanting as much flexibility and discretion as possible and the patient, if
choosing the physician because of some special confidence in that
physician’s particular abilities, desiring that the selected physician oversee
and personally perform the most difficult part of the procedure.
Id.
219. See JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 16 (2005)
(discussing that this Kantian principle has been of great significance to the field of
bioethics, highlighting autonomy as a governing principle in the field).
220. IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC
OF MORALS 91 (H.J. Paton trans., Hutchinson Univ. Library 1967) (1785).
221. Id. at 101.
222. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1424
(2004) (explaining that humanity has been defined by Kant as the capacity to
determine ends through rational choice).
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and therefore that rule out joint participation in the acts in
question.
Someone who violates these two commands refuses to engage
others as persons, in the first case by declining to address them at
all and in the second case by addressing them on terms that they
cannot accept. And in refusing to engage them, she estranges
herself from them and renders shared participation in a respectful
relation—at least in connection with the actions in question—quite
223
literally impossible.

Kant’s two commands anticipate the essence of our dilemma: in
one sense medical care administered by a resident is a learning
experience and thus does treat the patient as a means to educate the
resident. On the other hand, the patients—all patients—may share
in the “end” of benefiting from highly trained physicians and medical
specialists. Dilemmas like this are not unique; indeed, they are
224
inherent in the life of the law.
It has always been easier to accept
225
Dr. Gawande captured
casualties if we did not have to face them.
the sober reality of this dilemma during his residency, reflecting on
his own child’s hospitalization:
In a sense, then, the physician’s dodge is inevitable. Learning must
be stolen, taken as a kind of bodily eminent domain. And it was,
during Walker’s stay—on many occasions, now that I think back on
it. A resident intubated him. A surgical trainee scrubbed in for his
operation. The cardiology fellow put in one of his central lines.
None of them asked me if they could. If offered the option to have
someone more experienced, I certainly would have taken it. But
that was simply how the system worked—no such choices were
226
offered—and so I went along. What else could I do?

Practice by residents is thus portrayed as a matter of pedagogical,
utilitarian expediency.
But, although this “coldhearted
227
machinery . . . gets the learning done,”
it does not exact its
educational costs equally. Dr. Gawande comments:

223. Id. at 1425-26.
224. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970)
(articulating that the “threshold question” in a nuisance case involving air pollution
was “whether the court should resolve the litigation between the parties . . . or
whether, seeking promotion of the general public welfare, it should channel private
litigation into public societal objectives”).
225. Cf. Jennifer Hewett, Mesmerising, Until the Dead Stare Back, SIDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Mar. 27, 2003, available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/26/
1048653747489.html (noticing that the stark realities of death in the Iraqi war
become much more tangible and difficult to accept when the public is able to
continuously view such violence in the media).
226. GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 32.
227. Id.
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If learning is necessary but causes harm, then above all it ought to
apply to everyone alike. Given a choice, people wriggle out, and
those choices are not offered equally. They belong to the
connected and the knowledgeable, to insiders over outsiders, to the
doctor’s child but not the truck driver’s. If choice cannot go to
228
everyone, maybe it is better when it is not allowed at all.

Reconciling Kant’s commands—if they can be reconciled at all—
requires some effort to facilitate disclosure to patients of the status
229
and background of their treating residents.
Both patient and resident may invoke fairness arguments. Patients
may claim that they deserve treatment by experienced practitioners
and should not be unwitting guinea pigs. Residents may argue that it
is unfair to hold them to a standard expected of established
practitioners and specialists when they are still very much in a
formative, learning mode. Courts have had to face this kind of
fairness issue before in deciding standard of care questions.
A similar standard of care problem exists with respect to children.
Competing arguments exist there too; children may claim that it is
unfair to hold them to an adult standard, and victims may argue that
they deserve protection when children are engaging in adult
behavior. The law’s response has been a compromise. In general,
minor children are held to the standard of care expected of other
230
children of like age, intelligence, and experience.
But there is an
exception when the child who causes injury was engaging in an adult
231
activity. One rationale for the adult-activity exception is instructive
for our purposes. It is based on the likelihood that a potential victim
will be on notice as to the status of the child. When actors are
engaged in adult activities, potential victims may expect that adults
will be the relevant actors, and the law vindicates that expectation by

228. Id. at 32-33; see also Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care:
Lessons from Medical Consumerism and Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability
Rights Movements, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 151 (1994) (noting that many hospitals
undermine patient interests and deprive them of their autonomy by neglecting to
inform them that medical students will be examining them or that residents and
interns will perform their surgical procedures while being only supervised by a
licensed physician).
229. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Kant’s Formula of Humanity, in CREATING THE
KINGDOM OF ENDS 106, 124 (1996) (analyzing that when Kant speaks of rational
nature or humanity is an end in itself, he is referring to the human power of rational
choice).
230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 10(a)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005); DOBBS, supra note 78, at 293.
231. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 10(c)
(stating that a child is held to an adult standard of care when engaging in any
dangerous activity that would characteristically be undertaken by adults).
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holding such actors, even if children, to the higher adult standard of
232
care.
This analogy is useful for our purposes. If patients lack notice of
the true status and relative inexperience of the treating resident, as
233
many patients often do, then the application of a higher standard
234
Hopefully, my disclosure-based
of care becomes more justified.
standard of care rule could ultimately motivate more vigorous
promotion or enforcement of work-hour guidelines, more consistent
and transparent supervision of residents, and more clearly delineated
lines of responsibility between residents and attending or supervising
physicians.
My proposal also offers a predictable rule. Although the proposed
rule is grounded on respect for the collective expectations of patients
generally, it does not (apart from one limited exception for specialty232. See DOBBS, supra note 78, at 301 (stating that “when the older minor creates
risk to others who cannot identify the actor as a minor or protect themselves, the
adult standard seems the most appropriate one for protecting the reasonable
expectations of the other party”); see also David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations
and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the
Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 46 (1981) (concluding that in cases
where it is unclear whether a minor should be judged by an adult or a child standard
of care, that courts should take into account the reasonable expectations of the other
party dealing with the minor). Seidelson continues by adding that where the other
party contemplates that the minor is displaying a level of knowledge, skill, or
maturity below that of an adult, that the minor should receive the benefit of being
judged according to the child standard of care. Id.; cf. Ritchie-Gamester v. City of
Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Mich. 1999) (adopting a recklessness standard for
coparticipants in recreational activities and reasoning that this standard most
accurately reflects the actual expectations of participants in recreational activities
that carry a risk of inadvertent harm, known to the party at the outset).
233. See GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 32 (explaining that very few people have the
medical knowledge that would even enable them to ask the right questions and
determine the level of experience possessed by each person who is participating in
their treatment). One poll conducted by the National Sleep Foundation found that
eighty-six percent of respondents indicated that they would feel anxious about their
safety if they learned that the doctor that will be performing their surgery had been
on duty for twenty-four consecutive hours, but seventy percent reported that they
would request another doctor and sixty percent would be unlikely to assume that the
procedure would go “well.” NAT’L SLEEP FOUND., 2002 SLEEP IN AMERICA POLL 26
(2002), available at http://www.sleepfoundation.org/content/hottopics/2002SleepI
nAmericaPoll.pdf. What would the public’s response be if asked to consider their
reaction if they were told that their doctor was only a resident?
234. See Seidelson, supra note 232, at 25 n.34. Seidelson argues:
[T]he basic reason for imposing a professional standard on one who engages
in a professional activity is the anticipation of the other party that the
‘professional’ is what he purports to be. When that anticipation does not
reasonably exist and the actor is in fact not a professional, for example, when
‘Aunt Minnie’ suggests a home remedy to her nephew - the court is unlikely
to impose the professional standard on the actor. Similarly, it seems to me,
when the actor’s minority is known, actually or constructively, to the other
party, giving the minor the benefit of the child standard will do no violence
to the reasonable expectations of the other party.
Id.
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oriented residents) demand a case-by-case inquiry of individual
expectations. Rather, it focuses on the presence, or absence, of
disclosure to the individual patient. Hence, under the rule that I
propose, the standard of care does not vary according to the
235
expectations of the patient.
The proposed approach offers a
bright-line rule for deciding whether a resident’s conduct is to be
evaluated by an experience-based standard or a more demanding
standard. Under my test, the question of the applicable standard of
care would be determined by the presence or absence of actual
disclosure to the patient, unless the defendant can prove the patient’s
236
reasonable expectations were of some less demanding standard.
By fostering disclosures, my rule is consistent with the fiduciary
obligation owed to patients by their treating physicians. Although the
physician-patient relationship has been characterized by a number of
237
metaphors,
the dominant metaphor is that of a fiduciary
238
relationship.
In general, “[t]he law has imposed obligations on
235. Cf. Caroline Forell, Reassessing the Negligence Standard of Care for Minors, 15
N.M. L. REV. 485 (1985). In connection with the standard of care for children,
Professor Forrell rejects tying the application of the “adult activity” exception to a
test based on the reasonable expectations of the victim. She reasons:
Even if a uniform reasonable expectations test were adopted, such a test
would require a case-by-case determination of whether the plaintiff knew or
should have known that the defendant was a minor. There would be no
certainty as to which standard applied to any category of activities . . . . The
unpredictability of such a test would probably only make this area even more
murky and analytically dissatisfying.
Id. at 502 n.98. As to which standard of care applies to children, Forell would base
her rule on a distinction between dangerous and carefree activities, which she says
would be founded on a “fairness” rationale. Id. at 506-08.
236. Cf. Zaverl v. Hanley, 64 P.3d 809 (Alaska 2003) (describing that the alleged
negligence of the patient’s surgeon resulted in the death of the patient during
surgery). The defendant-surgeon argued that he should be held merely to the
standard of a general surgeon, rather than to the standard of a thoracic or vascular
surgeon. Id. at 817. The court held that the surgeon could be held to the higher
standard even if he had not led the patient to have an actual expectation that he
would exercise a greater level of skill, as long as he took affirmative steps to hold
himself out to the public as such a specialist. Id. Although the court found error in
the jury instructions, the error was deemed harmless. Id. at 817-18.
237. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties
and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 242 (1995).
Rodwin identified various metaphors for the patient-physician relationship:
[P]arent-child relations (paternalism); seller-purchaser transactions
(consumerism); teacher-student learning (education); relations among
partners or friends (partnership or friendship); or rational parties entering
into negotiations or contracts (negotiation or rational contract). Doctors
have also been viewed both as priestly healers and engineers.
Id. at 241.
238. See id. at 242; see also Barry R. Furrow, Forcing Rescue: The Landscape of Health
Care Provider Obligations to Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 51 (1993) (observing
that medical patients are vulnerable and that such vulnerability imposes a fiduciary
obligation on physicians that is justified by the physician’s dominant position in the
physician-patient relationship). Although Professor Rodwin has also referred to
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physicians, often when they have done something to create reliance
239
or a generalized sense of security.” I invoke this fiduciary duty not
as a basis for a new standalone cause of action, but as support for my
240
disclosure-mediated standard of care rule.
My proposed rule will
help to assuage the concern held in the field of medicine that there is
a disconnect between the ideal of fiduciary duty and the realism of
241
practice. It would address the problem that patients are not always
informed that medical students, residents, and interns are examining
them or will be performing their treatment under the supervision of
242
a doctor for the benefit of medical training.
A number of courts have recognized that a physician owes a
fiduciary duty to his patients when subject to a potential conflict of
interest. Most notably, the Supreme Court of California held that the
duty to obtain informed consent includes a duty to disclose personal
243
research or economic interests unrelated to the patient’s health.
Failure to disclose such potentially conflicting interests may violate
the duty to secure informed consent and the fiduciary duty owed by
244
the attending physician to the patient. A fiduciary obligation would
consumerism as the “reining metaphor,” the autonomy and self-determination
interests of patients seem paramount under either the fiduciary or consumerism
characterization and both characterizations advocate for an increase in the amount
of information available to the consumer-patient. Rodwin, supra note 228, at 153.
239. Furrow, supra note 238, at 56
240. Cf. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 498-500 (Ill. 2000). The plaintiff
alleged, in a wrongful death claim, that defendant physician’s failure to order an
angiogram for her husband resulted in his failure to diagnose her husband’s
impending fatal heart attack. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant breached
a fiduciary obligation by failing to disclose that incentives existing under the
defendant’s arrangement with the patient’s health maintenance organization
(HMO) put the defendant’s financial well-being in direct conflict with the patient’s
physical well-being. Id. at 499. In her second count, the plaintiff further claimed
that that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty by refusing to authorize further
testing or refer the patient to a specialist. Id. The Supreme Court of Illinois
declined to recognize a new, separate cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty
under these circumstances because such a claim duplicated the traditional medical
negligence claim, which the court found would sufficiently address the same alleged
misconduct. Id. at 503. But the court did hold that evidence of the HMO incentive
plan might be relevant if the defendant testified in the medical negligence trial on
possible issues of credibility and bias on cross-examination. Id. at 506.
241. Rodwin, supra note 237, at 247 (explaining that although physicians think of
themselves as fiduciaries and courts sometimes label physicians as fiduciaries, that
such legal fiduciary principles have been applied to physicians only in limited
instances, such as obtaining patients’ informed consent prior to treatment).
242. Rodwin, supra note 228, at 151.
243. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990); see supra
note 163.
244. Id. at 485; see also Morris, supra note 154, at 361 (discussing the importance of
being able to trust one’s physician). Morris goes on to say:
If, however, the physician has a financial or other interest that conflicts, or
even potentially conflicts, with the physician’s fiduciary duty to the patient’s
health, but does not reveal that conflict to the patient, the physician betrays
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be kindled in the resident-treatment context because of the potential
conflict between, on the one hand, the patient’s health and
autonomy interests, and, on the other, the resident’s interest in
advancing his education, society’s interest in an educated medical
profession, and hospitals’ interest in meeting their staffing
requirements with the inexpensive cadre of residents. As Barry
Furrow has darkly noted, “[t]he tension in the fiduciary disclosure
cases is tangible—a physician must rescue a patient from the
physician’s own mixed motivations and conflicts of interest between
the patient’s good and his own. The rescuer and the person posing a
245
danger are folded into the same person.”
The disclosure rule that I contemplate is animated by a softer glove
than if such disclosures were mediated through an unvarnished
expansion of the informed consent doctrine, with its slippery slope
246
and manifold causation complexities. As evidenced by the universal
adoption of the carrot of Good Samaritan Laws, physicians seem to
247
need encouragement to be Good Samaritans.
My approach
similarly relies on the promise of a more forgiving, experience-based
standard of care to encourage disclosure. Not only does it avoid the
casuistries of informed consent, but it also provides residents with a
readily available window through which to avail themselves of a more
forgiving, experience-based standard of care.
This construct is more true to the spirit of a fault-based system of
malpractice. How can these residents be deemed at fault if their
performance was consistent with their novice status as participants in
graduate medical education? This compromise also reflects a more
flexible and all-encompassing idea of duty, one with a necessarily
248
broader spectrum of beneficiaries than exclusively the patient.
that trust. If the physician knows of his or her own obvious physical
infirmities (HIV-positive status, substance abuse) or inexperience that may
increase the risk of harm to the patient, but does not disclose them to the
patient, the physician betrays that trust.
Id. In discussing the holding in Moore, Morris reasons:
After all, if a surgeon’s HIV-positive status must be revealed because it
nominally increases the patient’s risk of contracting the AIDS virus, a
surgeon’s research interest or economic interest that may influence a
surgeon to recommend surgery that subjects the patient to all the risks of
harm inherent in that operation and all the consequences of that operation,
should require a similar disclosure.
Id. at 353-54.
245. Furrow, supra note 238, at 52.
246. See supra notes 152-160 and accompanying text (addressing the complications
that are inherent in the informed consent doctrine in this context).
247. Furrow, supra note 238, at 52 (discussing statutes that may, in some
circumstances, lessen potential liability for physicians who render emergency aid).
248. Rodwin, supra note 237, at 242. Professor Rodwin asserts:
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Professor Marc Rodwin notes the possibility of balancing the inherent
competing interests of the patient, physician, hospital, and society
within a fiduciary framework, as long as doctors properly disclosed all
249
relevant information to their patients.
C. “Hell No—I Want a Real Doctor” and Other Perturbations
The proposed disclosure-facilitating rule admittedly carries with it
possible complications. What if the patient, after being told of a
resident’s status, responds, “Hell no. I want a ‘real doctor.’”? Now
what? This is why it is important to reach an understanding with
patients in advance so that if necessary, other arrangements can be
made. Thus, if a patient demurs, the parties should consider trying
to reach agreement on one of the following alternatives: an agreed
level of resident participation; an understanding that the resident will
not care for the patient; or, an understanding that the attending
physician should primarily care for the patient without the resident’s
full participation. If the foregoing accommodations are not
acceptable, then the attending physician overseeing the resident may,
after providing reasonable notice to the patient affording a
reasonable opportunity for care by other providers, want to consider
withdrawing from the case if otherwise consistent with rules
regarding the duration and termination of the physician patient
relationship. In any event, patients should remember that it may, or
may not, be true that a predictably (statistically) better outcome
would be achieved at a non-teaching hospital as compared to a
teaching hospital, even if the latter is staffed in part with residents.
The condition of the patient and the time pressures of emergency
care may also be complicating factors. How does a resident disclose
to an unconscious patient (or his surrogates) with a life-threatening
gunshot wound who is rushed by ambulance to an emergency room?

[H]ealth policy now focuses on the population rather than individual
patients. Given the formidable costs of medical care and the increasing
dependence of doctors on organizations that employ and pay for their
services, physician loyalty is weakened for patients and strengthened for
other parties. These facts suggest that the law may consider the interests of
these other groups in the future and that other metaphors may more aptly
describe patient-physician relationships. Nonetheless, there is reason to
think that the law will continue to address strained physician loyalty within a
fiduciary framework. It may impose limits on and stretch the fiduciary
metaphor to reconcile obligations of doctors to patients with service to
groups and society.
Id.
249. Id. at 255-56 (explaining that many fiduciaries have to balance varying
interests of competing individuals or groups).
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250

Should precious time during the “golden hour” be spent educating
accident victims (or their surrogates) about the nature of residency
programs and graduate medical education?
There may also be questions about what information should
constitute sufficient disclosure to entitle the residents to the more
forgiving, experience-based standard of care. The disclosure should
251
not depend on the patient specifically asking—“are you a resident?”
Nor should the resident be entitled to assume that everyone knows
252
who the residents are and what the term “resident” means. And, of
course, the disclosure should be communicated directly to the
253
patient (or surrogate).
That said, we must remember that there are competing interests
here. As Professor Mark Hall has counseled in another context, we
must develop rules of medical disclosure that can reconcile legal
254
idealism with economic necessity.
Educating residents in order to
develop future specialists is essential to our health care system. At the
margins, there may also be concerns that as disclosures proliferate to
include potential conflicting interests—here, in the educational
250. The “golden hour” is the sixty minutes following an injury. See E. Brooke
Lerner & Ronald M. Moscati, The Golden Hour: Scientific Fact or Medical “Urban
Legend”?, 8 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 758, 758 (2001) (explaining that the term reflects
the belief that trauma patients have better outcomes if they receive medical care
within an hour of sustaining an injury). The concept of the golden hour appears to
have evolved during the Vietnam War, where the survival rate in medical facilities
increased by two percent from previous wars and the time between injury and
treatment was reduced to one hour, down from approximately five hours in the
Korean War. Id. at 759.
251. For the classic statement on this in the informed consent context, see
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Canterbury Court
states: “We discard the thought that the patient should ask for information before
the physician is required to disclose. Caveat emptor is not the norm for the
consumer of medical services.” See Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed
Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 563 (1997) (citing Canterbury and its theory that patients
lack a level of sophistication necessary to apply caveat emptor in the arena of medical
services, in rejecting a so-called “transparency standard” that obligates patients to ask
questions of doctors when further explanation or clarification is needed).
252. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (referring to the passage in
Gawande’s book, COMPLICATIONS, where he discusses how much easier it is to ask the
necessary questions about a resident’s involvement in a surgical procedure when one
has a medical background and thus an appreciation of who the “players” are in the
surgical context).
253. Cf. Grant v. Douglas Woman’s Clinic, 580 S.E.2d 532, 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)
(stating that a doctor’s notation on the patient’s medical chart that the doctor had
“nothing to add” did not constitute reasonable notice to the patient of the doctor’s
unilateral decision to withdraw from the relationship and enable the patient to
obtain substitute care).
254. See Hall, supra note 251, at 515 (discussing the compromise that exists when
patients are on medical welfare or a more affordable form of limited, noncomprehensive health insurance because under these systems, patients no longer
have complete financial autonomy to order any and all beneficial medical treatment
available).
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advancement of the resident—not only will patients be stressed and
distracted by having to decide how to react, especially when a
negative reaction may be perceived as impugning the professional
standing of an inexperienced resident, but the overall effect may
undermine the level of trust between the patient and the health-care
255
professionals who care for him.
How then might the contemplated resident disclosure be
streamlined without it disintegrating into a rote “medical Miranda
256
warning?”
Here are some suggestions as to how this might work.
Medical workers should consider a global disclosure at the first
meeting between the patient and a resident (or his supervising
257
physician) with ongoing responsibilities.
Professor Hall has
discussed the practical need for what he terms “bundling” of consent.
“Bundled consent,” he says, is “how we now view a single decision to
be hospitalized or to undergo surgery. These decisions are taken as
255. See id. at 548 (commenting, in connection with disclosures of a physician’s
potentially conflicting financial interests, that “[i]t is difficult to see how patient trust
could survive ongoing disclosures of this nature, yet it is patient trust that informed
consent is designed to foster,” and quoting the experience of one physician in an
HMO gatekeeping capacity that “the collective impact of these negative encounters,
though each in itself might have been minor, created a climate of suspicion,
cynicism, readiness to fight, and a sense of being used that permeated my office in a
way that I had not known before”).
256. Alan Meisel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal and Ethical Myths About Informed Consent,
156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2522 (1996) (asserting that “[a]s practiced, and
certainly as symbolized by consent forms, informed consent is often no more than a
medical Miranda warning”). The danger of the meaningless, rote disclosures is a
special concern once a patient is admitted to a hospital. Professor Cathy Jones
explains:
The actual process of informed consent falls even shorter of its theoretical
goals, however, once the patient is admitted. At least two reasons contribute
to this shortcoming: first, the “status” of the in-patient . . . . The second
reason for the further decline in the application of the informed consent
procedures once patients are hospitalized is that so much of what occurs in
the hospital is “routine” (at least to the providers), and therefore, the
providers do not deem formal disclosure and consent requirements to be
necessary. The notion of routineness and lack of necessity to make
disclosure or seek consent for many procedures performed on patients once
they enter hospitals is reinforced by the admitting process.
Jones, supra note 156, at 404-06.
257. Hall contends:
Some global disclosure of cost containment incentives, rules, and
mechanisms is required at the outset of enrollment, although this presently
is not done. If such a disclosure can be accomplished, it would validate at
least some subsequent cost containment decisions without the need for
doctors to make (non)treatment-specific disclosures at the bedside. This
results from either a bundled consent conception or from a waiver of
consent conception. For either of these characterizations to hold, however,
some meaningful choice must exist at the time of insurance enrollment, a
choice that does not presently exist for many—perhaps the majority—of
subscribers to managed care plans.
Hall, supra note 251, at 582.

KING.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

2/22/2006 3:08:07 PM

THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR RESIDENTS

747

entailing consent to hundreds of discrete events of testing,
medication, and bodily examination during the course of what may
258
Bundling is
be a rather long and complex episode of treatment.”
consistent with modern “relational contracting” theory, which
contemplates that:
[I]t is unrealistic to impose on patients and physicians the
impossible burden of specifying the minutiae of an explicit
contractual standard of medical practice. Instead, the law assumes
that doctors, when they take on the care of a patient, automatically
promise the bundle of unspecified treatment obligations entailed
in customary professional practice. Patients cannot assert that they
are not governed by the conventional practice standard simply
because they lack specific notice of its content. When patients
choose generalists over specialists, or choose non-physician allied
health professionals or practitioners of holistic medicine, it is taken
for granted that a lower or different standard of care applies
without the need to specifically warn patients that superior care
259
may be available elsewhere.

Following the initial global disclosure and consent, specific
additional disclosures might be appropriate. Medical residents with
functional responsibility for a patient should disclose what his
responsibilities will be in connection with general management of the
patient’s care and with respect to each diagnostic or therapeutic
medical procedure for which a separate, discrete disclosure or
warning of the risks is required under the applicable rules of
260
informed consent.
These disclosures should include information
on the residents’ responsibilities for preoperative decisionmaking;
actual performance of, or functional responsibilities for, surgical,
diagnostic, or other discrete procedures; and the resident’s postoperative management and decisionmaking role.
A question may arise as to whether my test would require the
disclosure of comparative performance statistics by the resident. In

258. Id. at 559.
259. Id. at 560. Hall elaborates:
This practice is consistent with legal doctrine, which presumes that, by
submitting oneself to treatment, a patient consents, absent any objection, to
the many minor bits and pieces that make up the entire treatment
encounter. This “bundling” concept of informed consent arises by legal
implication even though the patient receives no risk/benefit disclosure
about each of these component parts.
Id. at 553.
260. Recall that my suggested approach is not based on informed consent per se,
but rather uses the scope of disclosure rules simply to define the range of
appropriate disclosure in order to determine the standard of care that will be
applied to medical residents.

KING.OFFTOPRINTER

748

2/22/2006 3:08:07 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:683

general, I would say no. First, given the diversity of backgrounds and
experiences among residents and the varied hospital settings in
which they serve, it would seldom be feasible to attempt relevant
statistical comparisons. Any attempt at statistical comparisons would
also be thwarted by the fact that much of what a resident does will
presumably have been done under some level of supervision, albeit of
decidedly mixed quality, by more senior physicians. Morbidity and
mortality outcomes may thus be a function of the quality and level of
supervision and involvement by the attending physician overseeing
the resident. Thus, performance outcomes may reflect other
variables in addition to the capacities of the resident. On a heuristic
level, there may also be cognitive biases and limitations that challenge
261
patients’ comprehension of statistical information, especially when
communicated in the highly stressful treatment environment.
The matter of residents and disclosure remains a quandary, as Dr.
Gawande again forthrightly reminds us from the trenches:
We find it hard, in medicine, to talk about this with patients.
The moral burden of practicing on people is always with us, but for
the most part unspoken. Before each operation, I go over to the
pre-operative holding area in my scrubs and introduce myself to
the patient. I do it the same way every time. “Hello, I’m Dr.
Gawande. I’m one of the surgical residents, and I’ll be assisting
your surgeon.” That is pretty much all I say on the subject. I
extend my hand and give a smile. I ask the patient if everything is
going OK so far. We chat. I answer questions. Very occasionally,
patients are taken aback. “No resident is doing my surgery,” they
say. I try to reassure. “Not to worry. I just assist,” I say. “The
attending surgeon is always in charge.”
None of this is exactly a lie. The attending is in charge, and a
resident knows better than to forget that. Consider the operation I

261. See Hall, supra note 251, at 570-71. Hall comments:
Most lay people (and even many doctors) suffer from a number of cognitive
biases and limitations in comprehending statistical probabilities, which
include: . . . Giving disproportionate weight to memorable, personalized
anecdotes—that Uncle Fred died from heart surgery is more important than
all the other information; . . . Exaggerating risk information by disassociating
it from its base rate of prevalence—harm to forty percent of people with
condition X is viewed as a high risk, even though condition X is very rare; . . .
Underestimating disjunctive probabilities and overestimating conjunctive
ones—where there is a fifty percent chance of harm A and a fifty percent
chance of harm B, people fail to perceive that the probability of either A or B
occurring is seventy-five percent but the probability of A and B occurring is
only twenty-five percent; and . . . Having different perceptions of the same
odds depending on whether they are framed in positive or negative terms—
five percent chance of failure vs. ninety-five percent chance of success.
Id.
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did recently to remove a seventy-five-year-old woman’s colon
cancer. The attending stood across from me from the start. And it
was he, not I, who decided where to cut, how to isolate the cancer,
how much colon to take.
Yet to say I just assisted remains a kind of subterfuge. I wasn’t
merely an extra pair of hands, after all. Otherwise, why did I hold
the knife? Why did I stand on the operator’s side of the table?
Why was it raised to my six-feet-plus height? I was there to help,
yes, but I was there to practice, too. This was clear when it came
time to reconnect the colon. There are two ways of putting the
ends together—by hand-sewing them or stapling them. Stapling is
swifter and easier, but the attending suggested I hand-sew the
ends—not because it was better for the patient but because I had
done it few times before. When it’s performed correctly, the
results are similar, but he needed to watch me like a hawk. My
stitching was slow and imprecise. At one point, he caught me
leaving the stitches too far apart and made me go back and put
extras in between so the connection would not leak. At another
point, he found I wasn’t taking deep enough bites of tissue with the
needle to insure a strong closure. “Turn your wrist more,” he told
262
me. “Like this?” I asked. “Uh, sort of,” he said. I was learning.

In addition to disclosures, both globally at the initial meeting and
then again prior to the surgery to detail more explicitly the
contemplated respective roles of the attending physician or surgeon
and the surgical residents, there are a number of possible innovative
techniques to facilitate patient comprehension of the information
263
provided.
The point is that if a resident wishes to be judged by a
more forgiving, experienced-based standard of care, then a sincere
and reasonable effort to inform the patient about that resident’s level
of experience and contemplated involvement seems a suitable
counterpoise.
CONCLUSION
Medical resident physicians are commonly named as defendants in
connection with injuries suffered by patients who received treatment
at hospitals, and vicarious liability claims against hospitals and others
depend on whether their employee-residents had committed tortious
262. GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 23.
263. See Jones, supra note 156, at 411-19 (mentioning that tape recording
conversations between the physician and the patient, providing the patient with
brochures or videotapes detailing the patient’s proposed treatment, and ensuring
that another person accompanies the patient in these conversations are among the
possible techniques a medical caregiver can use to enhance a patient’s
understanding).
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conduct. This Article explored the question of how the standard of
care rules for medical residents should be formulated. More
specifically, it asked the question of whether medical residents should
be held to the level of expertise expected of reasonably competent
generalist physicians, to specialists in the area of their residency, to a
more subjective standard reflecting the level and stage of training of
the particular resident physician in question, or in accordance with
some other rule. These important questions have been given short
shrift by the courts.
The question of the appropriate standard of care for medical
residents is complicated by the presence of competing interests. This
underlying tension springs from the need to accommodate two
potentially antagonistic or dissonant goals. On the one hand,
patients’ health is, and their lives are, at risk because patients are
treated by residents every day. A significant quantum of the health
care in the United States is delivered by medical-school graduates
who are engaged in post-graduate residency programs. But moving
from the microcosm to the long-term perspective, the health and
safety of us all depends on residents learning their profession in a
comprehensive way. Residency programs are vital components in the
education and training of physicians for the independent practice of
medicine. This is particularly true for the growing majority of
physicians today who undertake to practice a specialty.
The
challenge is to arrive at an approach that strikes a sensible balance
between the health, safety, and autonomy of patients, while
simultaneously accommodating the need for essential clinical
education of residents. Analysis of these underlying conflicting
interests has too often been absent, or at best, desultory and
inconsistent.
In Part I of this Article, I provided an overview of medical residency
programs. Part II briefly examined the approaches of the courts to
the question of the standard of care for medical residents, and also a
critical assessment of the potential use of the doctrine of informed
consent to address the matter of the relationship between residents
and patients. Part III proposed a different approach. Rather than
mediate the matter of treatment by medical residents exclusively
through either the standard of care or the doctrine of informed
consent (or some other information-based theory of liability), I
proposed a solution that melds the two doctrines.
This solution may be summarized as follows: when medical
residents (both not-yet-licensed and licensed ones) fully disclose their
status, including their experience, training, education, and
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credentials, to their patients, their performance should then be
judged by a standard of care commensurate with their actual level of
post-graduate medical training, education, and experience. Licensed
residents should, in addition and as a minimum, be held to the
standard of a licensed general practitioner. A resident (either
licensed or not-yet-fully-licensed) who either affirmatively misstates or
fails to disclose his status will not be permitted to avail himself of the
standard commensurate with his limited experience and training. If
a resident affirmatively misrepresents his credentials and experience,
then he should at least be held to the standard corresponding to the
professional background that he claims to possess. When a resident
fails to appropriately disclose his status, a not-yet-fully-licensed
resident should be held to the standard of care expected of a fullylicensed physician who has completed his internship. A nondisclosing licensed resident actively participating in a graduate
medical program to prepare him for a medical specialty should be
held to the standard of the specialty covered by his residency
program when serving the capacity of a specialist, unless he can prove
that the patient’s reasonable expectations were of some lessdemanding standard, in which case he will be held to a standard
commensurate with those expectations.
I believe that the foregoing approach represents a sensible
compromise between the competing interests of the safety of those
patients that are being treated by residents, and the longer term
interests in a health-care system that can offer its patients treatment
by well-trained physicians, particularly specialists. The contours of
the suggested approach also afford a predictable and workable
standard to the courts, physicians, and patients.

